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OVERVIEW

Between January 2016 and April 2018, New York issued almost 1.7
million driver’s license suspensions for traffic debt—nonpayments of
traffic tickets and nonappearances in traffic court.1
As this paper demonstrates, traffic debt suspensions disproportionately
harm communities of color in New York. Traffic debt suspensions force
people to make an impossible choice: stop driving—and lose access to
work, childcare, health care, food, and other basic necessities—or keep
driving, and risk criminal charges, more unaffordable fines and fees,
and even incarceration. License-for-payment laws ultimately create
conditions that parallel modern-day debtor’s prisons.
For these reasons, the New York Law School (NYLS) Racial Justice
Project urges New York lawmakers to support the Driver’s License
Suspension Reform Act (Senate Bill S5348A), which would end
suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances
in traffic court, practices which unduly target and harm communities
of color.

See the full report for detailed references.
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RESEARCH FINDINGS
Traffic debt suspensions disproportionately harm New Yorkers of color, and will continue to do so if the
current law remains unchanged. In New York City, the driver’s license suspension rate in the 10 ZIP codes
with the highest concentrations of people of color is two-and-a-half times higher than in the ZIP codes with
the most concentrated white populations. Outside of New York City, the disparity is even more extreme: The
suspension rate in the 10 ZIP codes with the highest concentrations of people of color is four times higher
than in the 10 ZIP codes with the most concentrated white populations.2
The racial disparity in suspension rates is consistent with data demonstrating racially disproportionate
traffic enforcement among communities of color. Although statewide data is not available,3 state police
data compiled in seven New York counties, as well as data from Suffolk County and Buffalo, show that people
of color are disproportionately stopped by law enforcement. For example, in 2017, Black individuals accounted
for 31.38 percent of the New York State Police’s traffic stops in Monroe County, yet made up just 14.4 percent
of the county’s population. In 2018, Black individuals accounted for 17.69 percent of the Suffolk County Police
Department’s traffic stops, yet made up just 7.2 percent of the county’s population.4
New Yorkers of color are also disproportionately ticketed, arrested, charged, and convicted for traffic violations
and driving on suspended licenses. For instance, drivers who reside in predominantly Black ZIP codes in Buffalo
are at least eight times as likely to be issued multiple tickets at a single traffic stop or checkpoint than those
who live in predominantly white ZIP codes. In New York City—where driving with a suspended license was the
fourth most charged crime in 2018—76 percent of the drivers are white, yet 80 percent of those arrested for
driving with a suspended license in 2018 were Black or Latinx.5 Data from outside New York State corroborate
these staggering racial disparities. Across the country, Black drivers are 20 percent more likely to be pulled
over than white drivers.6 Similarly, between 2011 and 2016 in Washington, D.C., 80 percent of the drivers
whose licenses were suspended for nonpayment of traffic tickets were Black—and there were even greater
racial disparities among those who were arrested for driving with a suspended license.7
This disproportionate traffic enforcement in communities of color is unrelated to traffic safety. It serves
to finance state and municipal operations, especially as state and local governments have become increasingly
dependent on revenue generated through traffic violations.8 In 2017, New York’s justice courts, which primarily
handle traffic violations and minor offenses, collected nearly $250 million in revenues through fines, fees, and
other exactions. Three local governments on Long Island are even more reliant on fines and fees than Ferguson,
Missouri, which the U.S. Department of Justice criticized for its overreliance on ticket-related revenue.9
The consequences of traffic debt suspensions are disastrous, entrenching people in a debt trap. Poverty
makes it difficult—if not impossible—for suspended drivers to pay off the fines and fees underlying their
driver’s license suspensions. Indeed, research shows that the suspension rate in New York’s 10 poorest ZIP
codes is nearly nine times higher than the suspension rate in the 10 wealthiest ZIP codes.10
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Kathryn Zickuhr, Applying a racial equity lens to fines and fees in the District of Columbia, D.C. POLICY CENTER (Apr. 22, 2019),
https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/racial-equity-fines-fees/#_ftnref22. Likewise, a 2015 study showed that in Virginia,
Black drivers represented nearly 50 percent of the drivers who had their license revoked for nonpayment, despite Black individuals
representing only 22 percent of the population. Danielle Conley & Ariel Levinson-Waldman, Discriminatory Driver’s License
Suspension Schemes, ACS LAW (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-landing/discriminatory-drivers-licensesuspension-schemes/#_ednref42.
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The onslaught of excessive fines, fees, and costs threaten individuals’ ability to secure and maintain
employment. A New Jersey study indicated that 42 percent of people lost their jobs after their driver’s
licenses were suspended; nearly half of those people could not find new jobs. Of those able to secure new
employment, 88 percent reported a decrease in pay. Suspensions are thus counterproductive because they
render individuals even less able to pay off the fines and fees underlying their suspensions.11
Traffic debt suspensions also senselessly entrench people in the criminal justice system. Seventy-five
percent of people with suspended licenses continue to drive because driving is essential for many New Yorkers
to access basic necessities. If they are caught, they are arrested and charged with driving with a suspended
license, which is one of the most common criminal charges in New York and around the country. Once arrested
for driving with a suspended license, people are saddled with more fines and fees, and are often jailed for long
enough to miss their rent payment or lose their job. This only serves to further exacerbate the underlying issue:
financial insecurity.12
Suspensions issued for non-safety reasons, like traffic debt, create a public safety problem. Two thirds
of all driver’s license suspensions in New York are issued for traffic debt—not for dangerous driving. These
suspensions increase the number of unlicensed and uninsured drivers on the road and divert law enforcement,
DMV, and court resources from true public safety problems.13
Traffic debt suspensions are an ineffective debt collection method that harms the overall economy.
Research has revealed the practice’s negative ramifications for GDP, tax revenue, and employers. A study
conducted in Phoenix, Arizona found that when 7,000 drivers had their licenses reinstated, GDP increased by an
estimated $149.6 million as a result, along with increases in employment and tax revenue.14
New York’s driver’s license suspension law may also be vulnerable to possible legal challenges. In fact,
several lawsuits challenging driver’s license suspension laws that authorize suspensions for non-safety reasons
have been filed around the country.15 New York’s law may run afoul of “fundamental fairness,” the standard
that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted to evaluate economic disparities in the justice system, and also
may violate the Equal Protection Clause. The law additionally may contravene federal agency regulations that
implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which could jeopardize billions of dollars in federal funding
for New York, its subdivisions, and its municipalities. Further, if courts were to find that the Eighth Amendment
applies to traffic debt suspensions, they might also find that New York’s driver’s license suspension law violates
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against excessive fines.16

RECOMMENDATIONS
For these reasons, the NYLS Racial Justice Project urges New York lawmakers to support the Driver’s License
Suspension Reform Act (Senate Bill S5348A), which would end suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets
and nonappearances in traffic court, practices which unduly target and harm communities of color.
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16

See infra Section VI.

New York Law School
The Racial Justice Project
Driving While Black and Latinx: Stops, Fines, Fees, and Unjust Debts
February 2020
Table of Contents
I. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a)................................................................... 3
a. Overview................................................................................................... 3
b. Proposed Reforms .................................................................................... 4
II. New Yorkers of Color Disproportionately Suffer from Driver’s License
Suspensions .................................................................................................. 5
a. New York City .......................................................................................... 5
b. Upstate and Long Island .......................................................................... 6
i. Upstate ................................................................................................. 6
ii. Long Island .......................................................................................... 8
III. People of Color are Disproportionately at Risk for Driver’s License
Suspensions................................................................................................. 9
a. Heavier Traffic Enforcement Among Communities of Color .................... 9
i. New Yorkers of Color Disproportionately Subjected to Traffic Stops .... 9
1. New York State Police .......................................................................... 9
2. Suffolk County Police Department ....................................................... 10
3. Buffalo Police Department ................................................................... 11
ii. People of Color Across the Country Disproportionately Subjected to
Traffic Stops ........................................................................................ 12
iii. Pretextual Stops Generally Used Against People of Color for Reasons
Wholly Unrelated to Traffic Safety ....................................................... 13
b. People of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes Incident to
Traffic Stops ............................................................................................ 15
i. New Yorkers of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes
Incident to Traffic Stops ...................................................................... 16
ii. People of Color Across the Country Suffer Disproportionately Harsh
Outcomes Incident to Traffic Stops ..................................................... 17
c. Disproportionate Concentrations of Poverty Among Communities of
Color........................................................................................................ 19
IV. Consequences of Driver’s License Suspensions ..........................................20
a. Entrenches the Debt Trap ....................................................................... 21
b. Bloats the Criminal Justice System ..........................................................25
c. Endangers Public Safety ..........................................................................29
d. Harms the Economy ............................................................................... 31
V. Grave Lack of Traffic-Stop Data in New York is Problematic ......................32
a. Lack of Data Thwarts Transparency and Accountability .........................33
b. Availability of Data Drives Better Policing Practices................................36
VI. New York’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme is Vulnerable to
Possible Legal Challenges ...........................................................................37

a.

Fourteenth Amendment...........................................................................37
i. Fundamental Fairness .........................................................................38
ii. Equal Protection ..................................................................................42
b. Implementing Regulations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ......44
i. New York Accepts Federal Funds ........................................................46
ii. New York’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme Discriminatorily
Impacts People of Color .......................................................................48
c. Eighth Amendment Proscription Against Excessive Fines ......................49
Appendices .........................................................................................................54
Appendix A .....................................................................................................54
Appendix B .....................................................................................................56

2

I.

N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a)

a. Overview
In New York, traffic tickets come with a deadline requiring the person ticketed to either
pay the ticket or appear in court or before a traffic violations agency to contest the ticket.
New York law does not allow for a reduction, waiver, or deferment of payment, a partial
payment or payment plan, nor community service as an alternative to payment.1
If a person admits they are guilty or are found guilty by a judge, they are assessed a fine,
and given a payment deadline. If a person does not pay by the deadline, the court or
traffic violations agency notifies the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV), which sends a notice to the person seeking payment within 30 days. If the ticket
remains unpaid, the DMV then suspends the person’s license. This is referred to as a
failure to pay (FTP) suspension. If a person contests their ticket and then does not
appear, or if the ticket requires a court appearance and the person does not appear for it,
the DMV sends a 30-day notice to the person. If the person does not pay or appear by
the deadline, the DMV suspends the person’s license.2 This is referred to as a failure to
appear (FTA) suspension.
Additionally, for FTA suspensions, courts generally enter automatic findings of guilt and
impose fines, which if unpaid, become FTP suspensions—the result of one traffic ticket
then becomes multiple driver’s license suspensions.3 When a driver cannot afford a
traffic ticket, he or she has little incentive to come to court. Thus, poverty is a driver of
both FTP and FTA suspensions. As fines and fees quickly accumulate, the reality for too
many New Yorkers becomes permanent driver’s license suspension because they cannot
afford to pay the fines and fees required to have their licenses reinstated. Among the
fines and fees that must be paid to have one’s license reinstated is a $70 suspension
termination fee (STF) per suspension. To have one’s license reinstated, the STF(s) must
be paid along with the underlying fines and fees, in a lump sum.
The graphic that follows depicts the process and effects promulgated by N.Y. Veh. &
Traf. Law § 510(4-a):

See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a).
Id.
3 Id.
1
2

3

b. Proposed Reforms
If enacted, the Driver’s License Suspension Reform Act would implement several
reforms to repair New York’s broken FTP/FTA driver’s license suspension scheme. The
Act would:
• End suspensions for not paying or not appearing to contest traffic tickets.
• Grant courts and hearing officers the discretion to reduce or waive balances incurred as
a result of traffic violations.
• Require that affordable payment plans be offered at the greater of 2% monthly income
or $10 per month.
• Provide notice of the availability of payment plans at the time the ticket is issued, at the
time of sentencing, and in any communications involving the imposition or collection.
• Reinstate licenses suspended for not paying or appearing to contest a traffic ticket,
waiving the $70 STF.
• Revise and mitigate the crime of driving with a suspended license (known as aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in New York) by repealing multiple FTP/FTA
suspensions as an aggravating circumstance.
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II.

New Yorkers of Color Disproportionately Suffer from Driver’s License
Suspensions

Between January 2016 and April 2018, New York issued almost 1.7 million driver’s
license suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances in traffic
court (hereinafter Traffic Debt).4
Traffic Debt suspensions are strongly correlated with race. In 2016, over 679,000 driver’s
license suspensions for FTP/FTA were issued in New York.5 Put another way, 4.35
percent of the driving-age population in New York had their driver’s licenses suspended
for not paying or appearing to contest traffic tickets. This 4.35 percent is comprised of a
disproportionate percentage of people of color.6 The disproportionate impact of
suspensions is not surprising given that New Yorkers of color are disproportionately
subjected to traffic stops, which helps to drive the disproportionate number of driver’s
license suspensions among communities of color.7
a. New York City
In New York City, the driver’s license suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the
highest concentrations of people of color is two-and-a-half times higher than in the zip
codes with the most concentrated white populations.8 The examples that follow
demonstrate a sampling of data that show people of color are disproportionately
burdened with driver’s license suspensions.
The Bronx9
Zip Code
10474
10456
10457
10473
10460
10466
10454
10469
10461
10470
10465
10464

Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
99.1%
98.7%
98.4%
98.0%
97.3%
97.2%
96.5%
88.3%
62.3%
57.9%
53.4%
29.6%

Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People
70
61
66
64
62
68
74
54
43
46
46
31

Joanna Weiss & Claudia Wilner, Opportunity Suspended, Drivenbyjustice.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2020)
(analyzing data from the New York Dep’t of Motor Vehicles 2016–2017).
5 Ted Alcorn, Handcuffed and Arrested for Not Paying a Traffic Ticket, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/nyregion/suspending-licenses-minor-offense-money.html.
6 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
7 See infra Section III.a.
8 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
9 Id.
4
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Staten Island10
Zip Code
10303
10302
10304
10310
10301
10314
10306
10312
10308
10309

Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
78.3%
62.5%
61.8%
56.4%
56.2%
34.8%
22.7%
15.9%
14.3%
11.7%

Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People
135
98
92
79
81
43
51
42
38
48

b. Upstate and Long Island
Outside of New York City, the suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest
concentrations of people of color is four times higher than in the ten zip codes with the
most concentrated white populations.11 The examples that follow demonstrate a
sampling of data that show people of color are disproportionately burdened with driver’s
license suspensions.
i.
Upstate
Albany and Surrounding Area12
Zip Code
Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
12206
69.9%
12307
69.7%
12210
56.7%
12308
40.6%
12305
35.1%
12303
22.8%
12205
17.1%
12211
12.2%
12009
6.8%
12186
5.6%
12158
4.1%
12059
2.3%
12193
0.0%

Id.
Id.
12 Id.
10
11
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Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People
112
180
102
84
89
62
37
19
20
17
30
34
32

Buffalo and Surrounding Area13
Zip Code
Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
14208
89.4%
14215
86.4%
14204
85.5%
14211
84.4%
14203
63.7%
14212
49.9%
14207
46.8%
14216
25.4%
14226
22.0%
14222
21.7%
14225
16.8%
14220
11.4%
Rochester and Surrounding Area14
Zip Code
Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
14605
88.5%
14621
81.4%
14619
81.2%
14608
76.3%
14611
73.6%
14613
66.4%
14609
48.6%
14606
38.6%
14615
37.3%
14624
17.8%
14618
16.2%
14610
14.8%
14617
11.3%
Syracuse and Surrounding Area15
Zip Code
Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
13202
67.0%
13205
63.7%
13207
46.1%
Id.
Id.
15 Id.
13
14
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Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People
163
168
130
182
92
108
72
43
23
21
35
40
Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People
271
265
268
266
335
300
179
156
175
52
22
37
45
Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People
66
104
96

13208
13204
13203
13224
13210
13214
13078
13116
13215
ii.
Long Island
Nassau County16
Zip Code
11575
11550
11553
11003
11520
11590
11510
11542
11558
11561
11554
11530
Suffolk County17
Zip Code
11798
11717
11722
11701
11706
11749
11713
11091
11932
11950
11953
16
17

43.0%
42.7%
42.6%
42.1%
40.5%
24.4%
14.9%
10.4%
5.8%

67
97
62
63
44
29
9
29
17

Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
98.3%
91.9%
91.2%
82.4%
73.9%
58.8%
55.5%
39.6%
28.6%
22.1%
19.0%
11.1%

Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People

Percentage of Driving-Age
Population, People of
Color
91.1%
84.5%
76.3%
64.3%
62.2%
51.6%
47.1%
39.3%
38.7%
36.4%
30.6%

Traffic Debt Suspensions
per 1,000 People

Id.
Id.

8

136
92
98
71
80
63
59
34
45
30
17
10

177
90
101
86
72
74
118
76
67
100
77

11944
11976
11719
11787
11739
III.

26.1%
17.9%
16.4%
8.7%
6.0%

53
22
35
18
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People of Color are Disproportionately at Risk for Driver’s License
Suspensions

Nearly two thirds of all driver’s license suspensions in New York are for Traffic Debt, 18
and such suspensions are drastically compounded for communities of color. As people
of color are disproportionately stopped, ticketed, ticketed with multiple tickets, arrested,
charged, and convicted for traffic violations and driving with suspended licenses, people
of color are disproportionately at risk for driver’s licenses suspensions. Exacerbating the
risk are disproportionate concentrations of poverty among communities of color; as is
self-evident, poverty makes it more difficult to pay Traffic Debt.
a. Heavier Traffic Enforcement Among Communities of Color
Communities of color are disproportionately policed. Correspondingly, people of color
are disproportionately stopped, ticketed, arrested, charged, and punished. Therefore,
driver’s license suspensions—and the associated fines, fees, and costs—
disproportionately target and harm communities of color.
i.
New Yorkers of Color Disproportionately Subjected to Traffic Stops
Racial disparities in traffic stops are a pervasive problem in New York State, as they are
across the country. This helps drive the disproportionate share of driver’s license
suspensions that New Yorkers of color endure.
The data that follow demonstrate that various law enforcement agencies in New York
disproportionately stop people of color.
1. New York State Police
In response to the Stanford Open Policing Project’s request for traffic-stop data, the
New York State Police provided limited information regarding 7,962,169 traffic stops
they conducted between December 2009 and December 2017. The charts below
summarize pertinent available traffic-stop data from the 2017 calendar year across seven
counties, and compare the data to the relevant 2017 population demographics.19

Alcorn, supra note 5.
Data retrieved from Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops
Across the United States, Stanford Computational Policy Lab (Mar. 2019),
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/data/ and DATAUSA, https://datausa.io (last visited Dec. 31, 2019).
As discussed at length below, New York law does not mandate the collection and analysis of traffic-stop
data. See infra Section V.
18
19
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Albany County
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
71.8%
12.1%
5.96%

percentage of total stops
66.17%
20.53%
5.81%

Broome County
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
84.0%
5.06%
3.99%

percentage of total stops
68.78%
14.25%
6.01%

Erie County
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
75.3%
12.7%
5.47%

percentage of total stops
71.21%
16.97%
3.84%

Monroe County
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
70.3%
14.4%
8.79%

percentage of total stops
53.58%
31.38%
10.55%

Nassau County
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
59.6%
11.1%
17.2%

percentage of total stops
36.91%
24.59%
17.89%

Onondaga County
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
76.5%
11.0%
4.88%

percentage of total stops
70.76%
19.81%
3.57%

Suffolk County
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
67.1%
7.35%
19.5%

percentage of total stops
48.81%
14.83%
27.40%

2. Suffolk County Police Department
Pursuant to a settlement agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD), the SCPD is required to collect data
regarding traffic stops.20 Traffic-stop data is produced quarterly and is available to the
public.21
Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and Suffolk County Police Department
(Jan. 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/01/23/suffolk_agreement_1-1314.pdf.
21 Suffolk County Police Department Historical Stop Data,
https://suffolkpd.org/HistoricalTrafficStopData.aspx. Although the SCPD has achieved partial
20

10

The most recent data available estimates that the total population of Suffolk County is
approximately 1,497,595 people, about seventy-eight percent of which is of driving age.22
An analysis of the 2018 traffic-stop data reveals that the SCPD engaged in 166,739 traffic
stops in 2018. The chart below summarizes pertinent available traffic-stop data from the
2018 calendar year, and compares the data to the most recent available population
demographic estimates.
white drivers
Black drivers
Latinx drivers

percentage of population
68.5%
7.2%
18.6%

percentage of total stops
56.22%
17.69%
19.55%

Relative to the percentage of the population that Black individuals make up, it is clear
that they are disproportionately subjected to traffic stops by the SCPD.23
3. Buffalo Police Department
According to data obtained from the Buffalo Police Department (BPD) by attorneys
representing clients in litigation that alleges unconstitutional law enforcement practices,
the BPD’s Strike Force conducted more than 1,700 checkpoints between January 2013
and October 2017.24 The data shows that nearly forty percent of the checkpoints
conducted between January 2013 and June 2017 were conducted in three of Buffalo’s
seventy-seven census tracts, in which the Black or Latinx populations exceeded eightysix percent.25 The map below illustrates the concentration of checkpoints in low-income
communities of color.26

compliance with the agreement, it has yet to come into full compliance with the traffic-stop data practices
mandated by its agreement with the DOJ. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEVENTH REPORT ASSESSING
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE BY SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEP’T 6–7 (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download.
22 U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (on file with authors).
Note, the seventy-eight percent only accounts for individuals eighteen years of age and over. This estimate
is therefore likely under inclusive as it does not account for individuals that are seventeen years of age,
who are legally permitted to drive in New York State.
23 Given that only seventy-eight percent of the population is of driving age, the disproportionate impact on
Black and Latinx individuals is likely even more drastic than these statistics indicate. If Black individuals
account for 7.2 percent of the driving-age population (as they do for the general population), only about
5.62 percent of the driving-age population would be comprised of Black individuals. If Latinx individuals
account for 18.6 percent of the driving-age population (as they do for the general population), only about
14.51 percent of the driving-age population would be comprised of Latinx individuals.
24 Complaint ¶ ¶ 66–68, Black Love Resists et al v. City of Buffalo et al, Docket No. 1:18-cv-00719
(W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (based on data from the BPD listing Strike Force Checkpoint locations by
Census tract from January 2013 to October 2017).
25 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 68.
26 Complaint, supra note 24 app. A (based on data from the BPD listing Strike Force Checkpoint locations
by Census tract from January 2013 to October 2017 and U.S. Census demographic data provided by the
National Center for Law and Economic Justice).
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Further, social scientists examined sixty of the Strike Force checkpoints conducted in
forty-six different locations from April to May 2013 and found that of the sixty
checkpoints examined, fifty-three—or eighty-seven percent of them—took place in
predominantly Black or Latinx neighborhoods.27
ii.

People of Color Across the Country Disproportionately Subjected to
Traffic Stops
New York is not alone. “Racial disparities in traffic stops are large, ubiquitous across the
nation, and troubling.”28 A DOJ report revealed that in 2011 Black drivers were thirtyone percent more likely to be pulled over than white drivers.29 More recently, the
Stanford Open Policing Project examined about 93 million traffic stops conducted from
2011 to 2017 across twenty-one state patrol agencies, including New York, and twentynine municipal police departments. The study concluded that Black drivers are twenty

Andrew Wheeler & Scott Phillips, A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation Using Roadblocks and Automatic
License Plate Readers to Reduce Crime in Buffalo, NY (May 17, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2781126.
28 Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW &
SOCIAL CHANGE 21, 22 (2017).
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, No. NCJ
242937, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 (2013); Christopher Ingraham,
You really can get pulled over for driving while black, federal statistics show, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014,
2:44PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/09/you-really-can-get-pulledover-for-driving-while-Black-federal-statistics-show/.
27

12

percent more likely to get pulled over than white drivers.30 It further indicated that
among both municipal police and state patrol stops, Black drivers, on average, are more
likely to be stopped than white drivers.31
The DOJ’s landmark Ferguson Report revealed similarly troubling and racialized policing
practices there. Between October 2012 and October 2014, the Ferguson Police
Department (FPD) reported 11,610 traffic stops. Although Black individuals accounted
for only sixty-seven percent of the population, they accounted for 9,875—eighty-five
percent—of those stops.32 Moreover, Missouri’s attorney general recently released a
report demonstrating that Black drivers across the entire state of Missouri are ninety-one
percent more likely than white drivers to be pulled over by police.33 Data from other
jurisdictions further confirming that people of color are disproportionately subjected to
traffic stops are appended to this paper as an appendix.
iii.

Pretextual Stops Generally Used Against People of Color for Reasons
Wholly Unrelated to Traffic Safety
Pretextual stops are increasingly used for the purpose of generating fines and fees
revenue, and have little (if anything) to do with traffic safety. Indeed, there are 1,246
town and village justice courts which the State and its subdivisions use to raise millions
in revenue,34 so much so that six of New York’s municipalities rank in the top 100
nationally in terms of revenue generated from fines.35 In 2017, New York’s justice courts
Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United
States, Stanford Computational Policy Lab, (Mar. 13, 2019); AJ Willingham, Researchers studied nearly 100
million traffic stops and found black motorists are more likely to be pulled over, CNN (Mar. 21, 2019,
12:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/21/us/police-stops-race-stanford-study-trnd/index.html;
Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, Study Finds Racial Bias In Police Traffic Stops And Searches, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 19, 2019, 7:00PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/White-Black-drivers-police-stops-searchesracial-bias_n_5c916558e4b0f7ed945d4ba3; Erik Oritz, Inside 100 million police traffic stops: New
evidence of racial bias, NBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019, 1:00PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/inside-100-million-police-traffic-stops-new-evidence-racial-bias-n980556.
31 Pierson, supra note 30 at 3-4. Though the statistics that informed this conclusion “do not account for
possible race-specific differences in driving behavior, including amount of time spent on the road and
adherence to traffic laws,” the study authors employed a statistical approach known as the “veil of
darkness test” (i.e., the examination of stops conducted at times when it would be difficult for an officer to
view a motorist’s race prior to the stop) to mitigate the “benchmarking problem.” Id. at 4. The results after
implementing the technique similarly suggested that racial discrimination against black drivers informs
police officers’ stop decisions. Id. at 4–5.
32 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T 64 (Mar.
4, 2015). The Report acknowledged the limitations to using basic population data as a benchmark to
evaluate traffic stops, but found that the data was sufficiently reliable because “black drivers might account
for less of the driving pool than would be expected from overall population rates because a lower
proportion of blacks than whites is at or above the minimum driving age.” Id. at 64 n. 39 (emphasis in
original).
33 Summer Ballentine, Black Missouri drivers 91% more likely to be stopped, state attorney general finds,
PBS (June 10, 2019, 2:11PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/black-missouri-drivers-91-morelikely-to-be-stopped-state-attorney-general-finds.
34 OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL
ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT ON JUSTICE COURT FUND 1 (Aug. 2010),
https://osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/justicecourtreport2010.pdf.
35 Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016),
https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america.
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collected nearly $250 million in revenues through fines, fees, and other exactions.36 In
Nassau and Suffolk County, traffic court fines and fees totaled $146 million in 2017, up
about $104 million from five years prior.37 The fifty upstate town and village courts that
collected the most fines for traffic tickets and other violations in 2017 collected a total of
$171 million in 2017.38
Although the revenue generated by justice courts are shared between the State and
relevant jurisdiction, the funds allocated to the jurisdiction are a critical source of
funding for town and village government operations, supporting “budgets for police
protection, sanitation, road maintenance, and other key municipal functions.”39 And
disturbingly, research shows that cities, towns, and villages with larger concentrations of
people of color fine residents more on a per capita basis and are more reliant on fines
revenue.40 An analysis of data from 9,000 U.S. cities revealed that cities with higher Black
populations are more likely to use fines as a revenue source than cities with lower Black
populations, suggesting that fine revenue-generating practices unduly target communities
of color.41
The Investigative Post of Buffalo reported that pretextual stops in Buffalo were used to
generate revenue and unduly targeted communities of color. After the City of Buffalo
entered into an arrangement with the State that allowed it to retain most of the money
generated by traffic tickets issued by the Buffalo police—via the creation of the Buffalo
Traffic Violations Agency (BTVA)—the issuance of tickets, and revenue collected
therefrom, soared. Despite the increase in revenue—which exceeded $2 million—the
City subsequently imposed thirteen new fees that collectively added at least $100 to
virtually all traffic cases.42 The investigation uncovered that since the BTVA was
established, police write far more tickets for tinted windows—an equipment violation—
than for speeding or running red lights and stop signs, moving violations that involve
true driving safety issues.43 In fact, “tinted windows accounted for [seventeen] percent of
OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, JUSTICE COURT FUND TOWN AND VILLAGE COURT
REVENUE REPORT (2017).
37 Craig Schneider, Long Island finds a cash cow: Traffic tickets, NEWSDAY (Dec. 2, 2018, 7:15 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/traffic-revenue-1.24081944.
38 Michelle Breidenbach, 50 Upstate NY towns that collect most fines for speeding, traffic violations, NEW
YORK UPSTATE, https://www.newyorkupstate.com/news/erry-2018/07/ab2e7d572e1626/50-upstate-nytowns-that-colle.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
39 THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, Fines and Fees and Jail Time in New York Town and Village Justice
Courts: The Unseen Violation of Constitutional and State Law (Apr. 3, 2019),
http://moderncourts.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fines-and-Fees-and-Jail-Time-in-New-YorkTown-and-Village-Justice-Courts-The-Unseen-Violation-of-Constitutional-and-State-Law.pdf.
40 See, e.g., Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation, and Revenue:
Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW (2019),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1078087419834632?journalCode=uarb; Mike Maciag,
Addicted to Fines, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addictedto-fines.html; Michael Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation
and Exploitative Revenue Sources (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/49a1/4a1ed2448a788cb11f70c3c4bd91f790c1ca.pdf.
41 Sances & You, supra note 40.
42 Marsha McLeod, City Hall cashing in on traffic tickets, INVESTIGATIVE POST (Feb. 27, 2019),
http://www.investigativepost.org/2019/02/27/city-hall-cashing-in-on-traffic-tickets/.
43 Id.
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the department’s tickets issued, more than any other violation.”44 The investigation also
noted that Black and Latinx neighborhoods were targeted for traffic enforcement. These
pretextual stops, used for revenue generation rather than traffic safety,
disproportionately burdened communities of color.
Further corroborating this disturbing and pervasive trend of government reliance on
fines and fees revenue is the DOJ’s investigation, which found that the City of
Ferguson’s focus on revenue generation had substantial and comprehensive negative
impacts. It concluded that although the City was “aware for years about the impact its
focus on revenue had on lawful police action and the fair administration of justice” and
“[the City] disregarded those concerns—even concerns raised from within the City
government—to avoid disturbing the court’s ability to optimize revenue generation.”45
Three local governments on Long Island are even more reliant on fines and fees than the
City of Ferguson, which the DOJ intently criticized for “pressur[ing] officers to write
citations, independent of any public safety need, and rely[ing] on citation productivity to
fund the City budget.”46
Notwithstanding patent racial disparities among the people most impacted by ticketrelated fines and fees, and the fact that the use of vehicle codes for revenue generation
have proven to be an inefficient use of law enforcement resources,47 pretextual stops
continue to be employed against people of color for reasons that cannot be explained by
any legitimate law enforcement purpose.
b. People of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes Incident to
Traffic Stops
Not only are people of color more likely to subjected to traffic stops by law
enforcement, they are more likely to be ticketed and to receive multiple tickets than
Id. This percent appears strikingly high given that tinted windows accounted for less than three percent
of the tickets issued in Rochester, Amherst, and Cheektowaga. Further, half a dozen motorists reported to
the Investigative Post that when cited for tinted windows, they were given four tickets—one for each
window. Id.
45 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 15.
46 Kopf, supra note 35; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 64.
47 If not used for fines and fees revenue, pretextual stops are typically used for general investigatory
purposes, not to ensure traffic safety. When police officers effectuate traffic stops as a general law
enforcement strategy, the stops “have little (if anything) to do with traffic safety and everything to do with
who looks suspicious.” Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE
FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 21, 25 (2017). Unsurprisingly, racial disparities often ensue from
these “investigatory stops,” and may also bear a strong relation to poverty. Frank R. Baumgartner et al.,
Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 21, 25 (2017).
Correspondingly, racial disparities in traffic stops are lower for agencies who conduct traffic stops mainly
for reasons of safety, rather than for reasons such as broken tail lights or expired tags—offenses that are
generally disproportionately enforced against people of color. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, DEREK A. EPP &
KELSEY SHOUB, SUSPECT CITIZENS WHAT 20 MILLION TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND
RACE (Cambridge University Press 2018) (demonstrates through a study of twenty million traffic stops in
North Carolina that the use of vehicle code for criminal investigation is extremely inefficient as it leads to
very few contraband hits—throughout the fifteen-year period the study authors examined, only twelve
percent of individuals were arrested after a search incident to a traffic stop, and explains that racially
disparate search practices seem to happen because police tend to hold unwarranted suspicions about
young men of color).
44
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white people. Because they are also more likely to experience poverty than white people,
they are less likely to be able to pay traffic-related fines and fees. Accordingly, people of
color are disproportionately at risk for driver’s license suspensions and charges for
driving with a suspended license (which depending upon the circumstances can be either
a misdemeanor or felony in New York). This is the case in New York and across the
country.
i.

New Yorkers of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes
Incident to Traffic Stops
As an initial matter, because New Yorkers of color are more likely to be stopped by law
enforcement,48 they are also more likely to be ticketed and charged with driving with a
suspended license (known as Aggravated Unlicensed Operation (AUO) in New York)
because once an officer has stopped an individual, the officer will inevitably run a check
on the individual’s driver’s license. Since New Yorkers of color disproportionately
experience Traffic Debt suspensions, New Yorkers of color run a disproportionate risk
of being ticketed and charged for driving with a suspended license.
Despite the limited availability of information regarding the outcomes of traffic stops in
New York State,49 it is well documented that people of color are disproportionately
represented in the State’s criminal justice system: Black individuals comprise forty-three
percent, and Latinx individuals account for nineteen percent, of the State’s jail
population.50 Further, Black individuals are incarcerated in jails at 4.9 times the rate of
white individuals. Likewise, Black individuals comprise forty-eight percent, and Latinx
individuals account for twenty-four percent, of the State’s prison population. And Black
individuals are incarcerated in prisons at 7.1 times the rate of white individuals.51
Consistent with what we know about racial disparities in New York’s criminal justice
system, and what we know about the racial disparities in traffic-stop outcomes in
jurisdictions across the country,52 there is no reason to think racial disparities in the
traffic violation enforcement context do not also exist in New York.
Buffalo demonstrates that racially disparate traffic violation outcomes very much exist in
New York. Data from the New York State DMV suggests that drivers who reside in
predominantly Black zip codes in Buffalo are at least eight times as likely to be issued
multiple tickets at a single traffic stop or checkpoint than those who live in
predominantly white zip codes.53 The data likewise reveals that “drivers from
predominately Black zip codes are more than four times as likely to have their driver’s
licenses suspended because they cannot pay their traffic tickets than those who live in
predominately white zip codes.”54 The implication is clear: drivers of color in Buffalo are

See supra Section III.a.i–ii.
See infra Section V.
50 VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION TRENDS IN NEW YORK (Dec. 2019),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-new-york.pdf.
51 Id.
52 See infra Section III.b.ii and app. B.
53 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 85 (based on BMHA and DMV data).
54 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 86 (based on BMHA and DMV data).
48
49
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disproportionately charged and punished with traffic violations as well as for their
inabilities to pay the fines and fees that underlie such violations.
A BPD partnership between its Strike Force and its Housing Unit further underscores
these disturbing realities. In 2017 alone, the nineteen officers on the BPD Housing Unit
issued 14,853 traffic tickets and made 3,278 misdemeanor traffic arrests on or near
BMHA properties.55 The racial and socioeconomic demographics of the BMHA
properties where the Housing Unit spent the bulk of its time56 compel the conclusion
that it is more likely than not that the great majority of the people cited or arrested were
low-income people of color.
ii.

People of Color Across the Country Suffer Disproportionately Harsh
Outcomes Incident to Traffic Stops
The data analyzed by the Stanford Open Policing Project demonstrate that police ticket
and arrest Black and Latinx drivers more often than white drivers.57 For instance, the
researchers specifically found that when stopped for speeding, Black drivers are twenty
percent more likely, and Latinx drivers are thirty percent more likely, to get a ticket (as
opposed to a warning) than white drivers.58
Moreover, the DOJ’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD)
discovered statistically significant racial disparities in the outcomes people received after
they are subjected to a traffic stop. The investigation uncovered that while 8,987—or
ninety-one percent of—stopped Black drivers received citations, only 1,501—or eightyseven percent of—stopped white drivers received a citation. Similarly, while 891—or ten
percent of—stopped Black drivers were arrested as a result of the stop, only sixtythree—or four percent of—stopped white drivers were arrested. The investigation noted
that this disparity could largely be explained by the high number of Black individuals
“arrested for outstanding municipal warrants issued for missed court payments and
appearances,” which are often the precise circumstances that give rise to the driver’s
license suspensions at issue in New York.59 Even after using a regression analysis to
control for non-race-based variables, the DOJ investigation concluded that Black
individuals in Ferguson were two times as likely to receive a citation incident to a traffic
stop.60
Additional findings reinforce the DOJ investigation’s conclusion that Black individuals
disproportionately receive unfair and harsh post-traffic stop outcomes: In 2013, while
more than fifty percent of all cited Black individuals received multiple citations during a
Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 83 (based on BMHA and DMV data). BMHA’s population is about seventyfour percent Black and seventeen percent Latino; ninety-six percent of MBHA households are classified as
very low income. About thirty-five percent are under the age of eighteen, and thus are largely not of
driving age. Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 79 (based on BMHA and DMV data).
56 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶¶ 80–82 (based on BMHA and DMV data).
57 Pierson, supra note 30.
58 Pierson, supra note 30.
59 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 64–66.
60 This data “is not dependent on population data or on assumption about differential offending rates by
race; instead the enforcement actions imposed against stopped black drivers are compared directly to the
enforcement actions imposed against stopped white drivers.” Id. at 64.
55
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single police encounter, only twenty-six percent of non-Black individuals received more
than one citation. And as the number of citations issued increased beyond two, the racial
disparities grew starker. From October 2012 to July 2014, Black individuals accounted
for eighty-five percent of the 35,871 total charges (traffic citations, summonses, and
arrests) brought by the FPD. Further, the disparity in speeding tickets between Black
individuals and non-Black individuals “is [forty-eight percent] larger when citations are
issued not on the basis of radar or laser, but by some other method, such as the officer
own visual assessment.” Of the 460 individuals the FPD arrested during a traffic stop
solely because the person had an outstanding warrant, forty-four—or ninety-six
percent—of the individuals were Black.61 Similar to these findings:
•
•
•

•
•
•

“In 2015, the Las Vegas Review-Journal investigated law enforcement data and
found that residents living in the seven poorest, statistically [Black and Latinx]
zip codes account for nearly two-thirds of traffic citations.”62
Between 2009 and 2011, seven in ten people arrested for traffic offenses in
Washington D.C. were Black, and there were even greater racial disparities
among those who were arrested for driving with a suspended license.63
In Nebraska, where Black people make up roughly four percent of the
population, they accounted for nearly eight percent of the traffic stops and were
arrested incident to those traffic stops 16.9 percent of the time, compared with
just 2.6 percent for the general population.64
In Illinois, while citation rates across the state are mixed, there is “a large number
of law enforcement agencies citing [drivers of color] at significantly higher rates
than white drivers.”65
A 2016 review of traffic stops in Bloomfield, New Jersey revealed that although
the city is about sixty percent white, seventy-eight percent of ticketed motorists
were Black or Latinx.66
An analysis of one million traffic stops in Montgomery County, Maryland
beginning in 2012 confirms these same problems exist there as well—that

Id. at 66–67.
Advisory Paper from Nev. State Advisory Comm. on Municipal Fines and Fees in State of Nev. to the
U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 6 (June 13, 2017) (citing James DeHaven, Poor Residents Take Brunt of
Planned Vegas Muni Court Payments, L.V. REV. J. (June 15, 2015),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/poor-residents-take-brunt-of-planned-vegas-municourtpayments.
63 Kathryn Zickuhr, Applying a racial equity lens to fines and fees in the District of Columbia, D.C.
POLICY CENTER (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/racial-equity-finesfees/#_ftnref22.
64 Darrell Fisher et al., 2016 Traffic Stops in Nebraska: A Report to the Governor and the Legislature on
Data Submitted by Law Enforcement, NEB. COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUST. (Mar. 31,
2017),
http://ncc.nebraska.gov/sites/ncc.nebraska.gov/files/doc/traf%20fic_stops_in_nebraska_complete_final
_0.pdf.
65 ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, https://illinoistrafficstops.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
66 Mark Denbeaux, Kelley Kearns & Michael Ricciardelli, Racial Profiling Report: Bloomfield Police and
Bloomfield Municipal Court (Apr. 7, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2760382.
61
62
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•
•

analysis found that Latinx individuals are significantly more likely (and Latino
men even more likely) to receive tickets than white or Black individuals.67
An Oregon analysis of twelve police departments found disparate outcomes (i.e.,
citation, search, and/or arrest) for Latinx individuals.68
A 2014–2015 report issued by the Tucson Police Department found a noticeable
disparity in the issuance of traffic citations for Black drivers: while Black drivers
only represented 4.9 percent of the city’s residents, they received 6.5 percent of
all traffic citations. To a similar extent, other minority drivers, including Latinx
drivers “received traffic tickets at a rate slightly less than the percentage of each
ethnicity’s population in Tucson.”69

Data from other jurisdictions further underscoring that people of color across the
country receive disproportionately harsh outcomes following traffic stops are appended
to this paper as an appendix.
c. Disproportionate Concentrations of Poverty Among Communities of Color
People of color make up a disproportionate share of the two thirds of all driver’s license
suspended for Traffic Debt in New York. 70 As there is a strong correlation between
poverty and Traffic Debt suspension rates, this is likely in part attributable to the
disproportionately high concentrations of poverty within communities of color.71
Black individuals are three times as likely, and Latinx individuals are twice as likely, to
experience poverty than white individuals.72 In 2016, twenty-two percent of Black people
lived in poverty though Black people represented only about 13.4 percent of the U.S.
population; by contrast, approximately nine percent of white people lived in poverty, but

THE ECONOMIST, Measuring racial bias in police forces (June 22, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/06/22/measuring-racial-bias-in-police-forces.
68 OREGON CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY OF POLICING REPORT PER HOUSE
BILL 2355 (2017) (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.oregon.gov/cjc/CJC%20Document%20Library/STOP_Report_Final.pdf.
69 Amanda Le Claire, Police Ticket Disproportionate Number of Blacks in Tucson, ARIZONA PUBLIC
MEDIA (July 30, 2015, 5:07 PM), https://www.azpm.org/s/32764-tpd-releases-report-on-traffic-citationsand-race/.
70 This is consistent with the data presented in this paper above, as well as with data from other
jurisdictions.
[R]ecent data from California show a strong positive correlation by zip code between black
populations and driver’s license suspension for nonpayment or nonappearance at related court
hearings. In Virginia, too, data suggest black people disproportionately suffer driver’s license
suspension for nonpayment. This group also appears to suffer a disproportionate rate of
convictions for driving with a suspended license when the underlying suspension is due to
nonpayment. Similar disparities have been documented in Wisconsin.
Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven by Dollars: A State-By-State Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension
Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER 4–5 (Fall 2017),
https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf.
71 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
72 SHRIVER CENTER ON POVERTY LAW, https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Let-s-talk-about-povertyand-race.html?soid=1102452077294&aid=AtLAyFKnGvM (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
67
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represented about 76.5 percent of the U.S. population.73 Further, “Black and Latinx
families [are] less likely than white families to have significant wealth and other assets
that can provide a cushion in lean times, [and] are also disproportionately more likely to
be experiencing debt, another consequence of poverty with long-term and far-reaching
effects.”74 Such debt exacerbates financial instability and personal stress and curtails
future employment and housing opportunities through long-term effects on credit scores
and background checks.75
This unfortunate reality suggests that people of color are disproportionately at risk for
driver’s license suspensions issued for Traffic Debt.76 It likewise indicates that they are
disproportionately less likely to be able to take off work, find childcare, and/or retain
representation to ensure their appearance in court.77 Moreover, if one is unable to pay a
traffic fine, there is little incentive for them to appear in court, particularly given that
they risk “sitting out” their fine in jail for their inevitable inability to pay the fine; this
accelerates the risk of driver’s license suspension, which of course entails significant
additional and unaffordable financial obligations. Indeed, throughout New York, the
driver’s license suspension rate in the ten poorest zip codes is nearly nine times higher
than the suspension rate in the ten wealthiest zip codes.78
IV.

Consequences of Driver’s License Suspensions

Laws that permit Traffic Debt suspensions without requiring consideration of
individuals’ ability to pay have far-reaching ramifications. Not only do such laws
negatively impact the individuals whose licenses are suspended and their families, they
also harm our communities, public safety, and economy. Traffic Debt suspensions
seriously impede individuals’ ability to maintain their livelihoods, needlessly expose
individuals to the criminal justice system, perilously divert law enforcement efforts from
true public safety threats, and senselessly hamper the economy at large. Furthermore,
Traffic Debt suspensions are entirely counterproductive in that they make it more
difficult to collect debt from people who are too impoverished to be able to pay it. In
short, the consequences of driver’s license suspensions are deleterious for all.

Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the
Criminal Justice System, VERA INSTITUTE 10 (May 2018),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI225218 (last
visited Dec. 23, 2019).
74 Zickuhr, supra note 63.
75 Id.
76 Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 70 at 3 (“People in this group have fewer available resources to divert to
paying court debt, and are therefore at greater risk of losing their licenses for nonpayment. While wealthier
drivers have little difficulty covering court debt, people living paycheck-to-paycheck with little or no
savings and families to support may not be able to pay in a lump sum or consistently make payments on
installment plans.”).
77 Id. at 3–4.
78 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
73
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a. Entrenches the Debt Trap
For New Yorkers living below the poverty line, driver’s license suspension is all but
inevitable when faced with traffic fines, fees, and related costs. A full-time minimum
wage worker, in most areas of New York, grosses $472 per week, amounting to $24,544
per year; this indicates an average full-time minimum wage worker in most areas of New
York nets approximately $338 per week, amounting to about $17,576 per year. 79 In 2017,
14.1 percent of New Yorkers—over 2.72 million people—had incomes below the
poverty line ($24,860 or less for a family of four).80 But it is not only people below the
poverty line who struggle to pay traffic-related fines and fees. Given that forty percent of
Americans cannot cover an unexpected $400 expense, a substantial share of the
population likely cannot cover an unexpected traffic ticket and the related expenses.81
The fines that trigger Traffic Debt suspensions in New York can range from $45 to well
over $1,000, not including the fees and mandatory surcharge that attach.82 And, because
multiple tickets and multiple suspensions can result from one single traffic stop—and
disproportionately do for people of color—many drivers suspended for FTP/FTA face
thousands of dollars of debt that they cannot afford to pay.83 In addition to fines, New
York law prescribes a mandatory surcharge that must be assessed for traffic convictions;

New York Minimum Wage for 2018, 2019, https://www.minimum-wage.org/new-york (last visited
Dec. 26, 2019). This is based on New York’s state minimum wage. In Long Island and Westchester,
minimum wage is $13 per hour. In New York City, minimum wage is $15 per hour. The net estimates were
calculated using the federal income tax rate, twenty-two percent, and the New York State income tax rate
for the relevant bracket, 6.33 percent.
80 CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, NEW YORK 2018 REPORT, https://talkpoverty.org/state-yearreport/new-york-2018-report.
81 FEDERAL RESERVE, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2017 2 (May
2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-being-ushouseholds-201805.pdf.
82 See, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1800; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1809; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1225c; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1174.
83 See, e.g., Alcorn, supra note 5 (“Russell Pleasant, a lifelong resident of Staten Island, is facing a $3,295
judgment stemming from unpaid tickets issued on three occasions in the mid-1990s that snowballed into
[seventeen] license suspensions. Arrested in February, he was ordered to pay the debt completely or accept
a misdemeanor conviction. At age 57, it would be his first. To earn that amount, Mr. Pleasant would need
to work five weeks at the Ikea warehouse where he is now a forklift operator, a job he said he retrained for
this winter after the house his family was living in burned down.”); Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 7 (“[O]ne
class member was issued four separate tickets for having four tinted windows, costing him $720 ($180 per
window). Furthermore, in an effort to secure additional payment, the issuing officer offered that class
member a choice: jail or the immediate impoundment of his car. The class member chose impoundment,
and thus had to pay an additional $125 fee the next day to retrieve his vehicle, which he needed for his
livelihood.”); Complaint, supra note 24 ¶¶ 214–22 (“Defendant Thomas . . . issued Ms. Doe four tickets:
three seat belt violations and a violation for driving on a learner’s permit. . . . Ms. Doe contested the tickets
and eventually had a hearing before . . . the BTVA [which] sent Ms. Doe a letter finding her guilty of all
four violations and assessing eight points on her driver’s license and $446 in fines. As a result of this
incident, Ms. Doe also owed a Driver Responsibility Assessment in the amount of $450. At the time of
hearing, Ms. Doe was attending school full-time and had no income. Ms. Doe could not afford to pay her
tickets and surcharges in one lump sum. Ms. Doe sought a payment plan from the BTVA. The BTVA
refused to provide a payment plan or accept partial payments. Because she could not have a payment plan,
Ms. Doe could not pay at all. The NYS Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Ms. Doe’ learner’s
permit because she could not pay the tickets and surcharges.”).
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for certain traffic convictions, the surcharge is as high as $88–$93.84 Further, driver
responsibility assessments are imposed on drivers who accumulate more than six points
on their license within eighteen months; the assessment is $300 over three years for six
points, and an additional $75 for every point in excess of six points, payable over three
years.85 Additionally, in some jurisdictions such as Buffalo and Long Island, there are
about $100 in additional fees per traffic ticket.86
Drivers suspended for Traffic Debt in New York must pay a $70 STF along with the
underlying fines and fees in a lump sum, to get their license reinstated; if a driver has
multiple suspensions, they must pay the $70 STF for each suspension prior to
reinstatement.87 If an individual has multiple FTP/FTA suspensions, fees of up to $400
may also be imposed.88
It is all but obvious that fines, fees, and other costs quickly cascade and become
prohibitively expensive for people who could not afford what very likely began as a
simple traffic ticket. For many New Yorkers, coming up with these sums to pay the
traffic-related fines, fees, and costs before the payment deadline is an impossible feat.
People are forced to choose between paying the traffic-related fines, fees, and costs and
purchasing basic necessities for themselves and their families, which really is no choice at
all. Thus, Traffic Debt suspensions become inescapable and further entrench people in
an already insurmountable debt trap.
The loss of the ability to drive seriously threatens individuals’ economic security.
Without the ability to legally drive, individuals are impeded from meeting basic needs of
their families—they are precluded from legally driving to jobs, schools, medical
appointments, places of worship, grocery stores, etc.89 The irony of New York’s licensefor-payment scheme is that those who lose their licenses for their inability to pay trafficrelated debt are thrust deeper into poverty due to the financial consequences flowing
from the suspensions of their driver’s licenses. It therefore perpetuates the already
intractable cycle of poverty that too many New Yorkers endure. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized the financial consequences that inevitably
flow from government attempts to extract wealth from individuals charged with
violations such as those that underlie suspensions for FTP/FTA:

N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1809; Increases In The Cost Of Traffic Tickets In New York, ROSENBLUM
LAW (May 6, 2013), https://newyorkspeedingfines.com/increases-cost-traffic-tickets-york/. The law does
cap the surcharge that can be assessed per incident at $196. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE
COMPTROLLER, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRAFFIC TICKET SURCHARGES 5 (Aug. 2015),
https://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/14s26.pdf
85 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, How to pay a driver responsibility assessment,
https://dmv.ny.gov/tickets/how-pay-driver-responsibility-assessment (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
86 McLeod, supra note 42; Schneider, supra note 37.
87 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 503(j-1)(i); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, A Guide to Suspension
& Revocation of Driving Privileges in New York State, https://dmv.ny.gov/brochure/c-12.pdf (last
visited Dec. 23, 2019).
88 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 503(j-1)(i).
89 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST CMTYS OF COLOR: CIVIL
RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 35 (Sept. 2017); Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 70.
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Raising money for government through law enforcement whatever the source
. . . can lay a debt trap for the poor. When a minor offense produces a debt, that
debt, along with the attendant court appearances, can lead to loss of employment
or shelter, compounding interest, yet more legal action, and an ever-expanding
financial burden—a cycle as predictable and counterproductive as it is
intractable.90
Indeed, the California Legislature, “[i]n recognition of the counterproductive nature of
[the license-for-payment scheme] and its tendency to enmesh indigent defendants in a
cycle of repeated violations and escalating debt. . . amended several statutes to prohibit
the courts and the [DMV] from suspending a driver’s license because of an unpaid traffic
citation”91
Once a driver’s license is issued, it “become[s] essential [to] the pursuit of a livelihood,”
thereby rendering the suspension of driver’s licenses incredibly harmful to individuals
and their families.92 It is therefore unsurprising that there is a strong correlation between
driver’s license suspension and job loss as well as missed job opportunities.93 For
instance, a New Jersey study indicated that forty-two percent of people lost their jobs
after their driver’s licenses were suspended; nearly half of those people could not find
new jobs.94 Of those able to find new employment, eighty-eight percent reported a
decrease in pay.95 Similarly, a study conducted in Phoenix, Arizona demonstrated that
28.3 percent of individuals lost a job immediately after their driver’s license was
suspended; 52.9 percent of those whose license was suspended for more than three
months reported losing a job as a direct consequence of their suspended license. The
median annual income loss as a result of license suspensions was $36,800.96
Driver’s license suspensions thus trap people who are poor in an impossible
predicament. They often cannot work without their driver’s license because they lose
their method of commuting or because their job requires a valid driver’s license;
however, they also cannot afford to pay what is required to have their license reinstated
without steady employment. The bottom line is that for many New Yorkers, the
Rivera v. Orange Cty. Prob. Dep't, 832 F.3d 1103, 1112 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016).
People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1164, n.1 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (Mar. 27, 2019).
92 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
93 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 89 at 36; Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 70 at 3; Emily Reina
Dindial & Ronald J. Lampard, Opinion, When a Traffic Ticket Costs $13,000, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/opinion/drivers-license-suspension-fees.html.
94 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 89 at 36; Henry Grabar, Too Broke to Drive: States have
trapped millions of Americans in crippling debt by taking away their driver’s licenses. Can the damage be
undone?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2017), https://slate.com/business/2017/09/state-lawmakers-have-trappedmillions-of-americans-in-debt-by-taking-their-licenses.html; Joshua Aiken, Reinstating Common Sense:
How Driver’s License Suspensions for Drug Offenses Unrelated to Driving Are Falling out of Favor,
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/driving/national.html.
95 Aiken, supra note 94.
96 L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, THE CITY OF PHOENIX
MUNICIPAL COURT’S COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 2016: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (June 2,
2017),
https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/TFFAIR/Resources/SeidmanResearchInstituteReport2017.pdf.
90
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suspension of their driver’s license necessarily results in the deprivation of their
livelihoods because, in many instances, it robs them of their right to work for a living.97
As a practical matter, most individuals rely on driver’s licenses to travel to work and
maintain employment.98 “[A] license is often needed for commuting, particularly as jobs
are increasingly located outside of inner-city areas.”99 Although public transportation
may be a commuting solution for some, for those working or living outside of major
metropolitan areas, public transportation is generally not a viable option. Outside of
New York City, in places such as Rochester, Syracuse, and Long Island where public
transportation is scarcer, people are critically dependent upon their ability to drive to
maintain their jobs. Even if commuting via public transit is a theoretical option for those
living in metropolitan areas, there are often numerous obstacles, such as the substantial
additional time it takes to get to work using public transit100 as well as the “long
headways, limited service hours, costs, difficulty using transit to make multiple stops on
the way to or from work[,] and safety issues after dark,”101 that those commuting by
public transit face.
Further, a driver’s license “is a very common requirement for the sorts of job that can
actually lift people out of poverty—those in construction, manufacturing, security, and
union jobs including electricians and plumbers [as well as jobs in home health care,
motor vehicle sales and services, and delivery services].”102 In addition, “[m]any jobs
require driving as part of the work responsibilities; and even for non-driving jobs,
employers often require applicants to have a valid driver’s license as an indicator of
reliability or responsibility.”103 The result is that for people with a suspended driver’s
license, the pool of job opportunities is limited. These limited job prospects, in turn,
make the debt trap, and poverty, even more difficult to escape.
Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (pursuit of an occupation or profession is a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (“the right to
hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental
interference comes within the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of [Due Process]); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 41 (1915) (“the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
to secure”).
98 Danielle Conley & Ariel Levinson-Waldman, Discriminatory Driver’s License Suspension Schemes, ACS
LAW (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-landing/discriminatory-drivers-licensesuspension-schemes/#_ednref42.
99 Alex Bender, et al., Not Just a Ferguson Problem: How Traffic Courts Drive Inequality in California,
LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 17 (2015),
http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-DriveInequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf.
100 Mike Maciag, Riding Transit Takes Almost Twice as Long as Driving, GOVERNING (Feb. 2017),
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-transit-driving-times.html.
101 Evelyn Blumenberg & Daniel Baldwin Hess, Measuring the Role of Transportation in Facilitating the
Welfareto-Work Transition: Evidence from Three California Counties, J. OF THE TRANSP. RESEARCH BD
1859 (2003), https:// escholarship.org/uc/item/2ww4c93w.
102 Alana Semuels, No Driver’s License, No Job, ATLANTIC (June 15, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/; Bender,
supra note 99 at 17–18.
103 Bender, supra note 99 at 17.
97
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In sum, driver’s license suspensions further entrench the debt trap by impeding
employment opportunities. They foreclose people from employment because a license is
often needed for transportation to and from work and is increasingly required for certain
jobs, even jobs for jobs for which driving is not a job function. As people of color
disproportionately suffer from driver’s license suspensions, they correspondingly and
disproportionately face an additional barrier to the job market—the lack of a driver’s
license. As a result of this employment barrier, the individual now has a decreased ability
to pay what is required to get their license reinstated, which serves only to further
compound the debt trap.
b. Bloats the Criminal Justice System
Of equal concern, Traffic Debt suspensions needlessly expand the scope of the criminal
justice system, inducting staggering numbers of New Yorkers into the criminal justice
system on the basis of race and poverty, and fueling mass incarceration.
Since the ability to drive is crucial to daily life and the livelihoods of individuals, about
seventy-five percent of people with suspended licenses continue to drive.104 If they are
caught, they are arrested—establishing a means by which individuals are thrust into the
criminal justice system because of their inability to pay. In addition to making important
life responsibilities much tougher (and even impossible) to go about, Traffic Debt
suspensions paradoxically make it increasingly difficult for individuals to meet
subsequent court obligations.105 This can result in added FTA charges for individuals
who, in part as a result of their suspension, lack the resources and/or transportation to
make court appearances. Thus, many individuals continue to drive, even though they run
the risk of being stopped, ticketed, arrested, and charged for driving with a suspended
license because their survival depends on it.
More than seven million Americans have had their driver’s license suspended for Traffic
Debt.106 Between 2016 and 2018, New York issued nearly 1.7 million driver’s license
suspensions for Traffic Debt.107 As so many suspended drivers have no choice but to
continue driving to meet their families’ basic needs, it follows that driving with a
suspended license is one of the most common criminal charges in New York and around
the country:
•

According to DMV data, New York issued more than 108,000 tickets for driving
with a suspended license in 2018. Suffolk County issued the most tickets for
driving with a suspended license in 2018, handing out nearly 21,000 tickets.
Nassau County issued the next most tickets, totaling almost 8,500, with Erie

OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK CITY CONTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, FEES, FINES AND FAIRNESS:
HOW MONETARY CHARGES DRIVE INEQUITY IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 36 (Sept.
2019); AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, Best Practices Guide to Reducing Suspended Drivers 4
(Feb. 2013), https:// www.aamva.org/Suspended-and-Revoked-Drivers-Working-Group/.
105 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 50.
106 Justin Wm. Moyer, More than 7 Million People May Have Lost Driver’s Licenses Because of Traffic
Debt, WASH. POST (May 19, 2018) (“The total number nationwide could be much higher based on the
population of states that did not or could not provide data.”).
107 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
104
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County and Onondaga County following next, issuing 7,310 tickets and 6,320
tickets, respectively.108
Between 2014 and 2017 in Erie County, police charged a staggering 33,000
individuals with driving with a suspended license—in Buffalo alone, more than
14,000 individuals were charged with driving with a suspended license. Between
January 2014 and October 2018, “more than 900 drivers charged with these
offenses were shipped to the Erie County Holding Center . . . presumably after
being unable to post bail.” Of these 900 individuals, nearly seventy-five percent
were Black, though Black individuals make up just thirty-seven percent of
Buffalo’s population.109
In New York City, where substantially fewer people drive than in most places,
the fourth most charged crime in 2018 was driving with a suspended license.
Eighty percent of those arrested for driving with a suspended license in New
York City are Black or Latinx.110
In Michigan, the third most frequent charge leading to jail admission is driving
without a valid license.111 And, between 2008 and 2018, seventeen percent of
those jailed for driving without a valid license in Michigan were jailed for at least
one week. 112
In Illinois, police made over 43,400 arrests in 2016 for driving with a suspended
license—half the arrests were of Black drivers.113
In Florida, law enforcement issued over 232,000 citations for driving with a
suspended or revoked license in 2017—more than five times as many citations as
were issued for driving under the influence. Convictions resulted from 53,000 of
these citations, amounting to over 600 new offenses each day across the state,
and 98 per day in Miami-Dade County alone.114
Between 2013 and 2015, the Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department arrested and
charged 19,108 people for driving with a license that had been suspended for a
reason other than driving safety. People of color made up an overwhelming

DMV data obtained by Rosenblum Law and on file with authors. For additional historical data and
analysis, see Adam Rosenblum, Driving with a Suspended Driver’s License in New York, ROSENBLUM
LAW, https://traffictickets.com/new-york/criminal-charges/driving-with-a-suspended-license (last
updated Aug. 9, 2019).
109 Marsha McLeod, Suspended Driver’s Licenses Snare New York’s Poorest Citizens, THE CRIME
REPORT (May 23, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/05/23/535223.
110 N.Y. CITY COUNCIL FIX THE SYSTEM, New York City Council Speaker Corey Johnson is Committed to
Criminal Justice Reform, https://council.nyc.gov/data/fix-the-system/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2019).
111 David Guenthner & David Safavian, The next frontier of criminal justice reform: County jails, THE
HILL (Dec. 13, 2019, 7:00AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/474213-the-next-frontier-ofcriminal-justice-reform-county-jails.
112 Ted Roelofs, Michigan jails filled with unlicensed drivers, people who miss court dates, BRIDGE (Sept.
20, 2019), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/michigan-jails-filled-unlicensed-driverspeople-who-miss-court-dates.
113 Melissa Sanchez, Some States No Longer Suspend Driver’s Licenses for Unpaid Fines. Will Illinois Join
Them?, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 15, 2018, 4:00AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/illinois-licensesuspensions.
114 Carson Whitelemons, Ashley Thomas & Sarah Couture, Florida’s Counterproductive and Costly
Driver’s License Suspension Practices, FINES & FEES JUSTICE CENTER (Oct. 2019),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2019/11/florida-fines-fees-drivers-licensesuspension-driving-on-empty.pdf.
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proportion of these arrests—Black people were overrepresented at a rate of 3.6x;
Latinx people were overrepresented at a rate of 1.1x. White people were
underrepresented at a rate of 0.6x for these arrests. (During this timeframe, the
Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department also effectuated 4,391 arrests pursuant to a
warrant issued for FTP/FTA. People of color were also disproportionately
overrepresented for these arrests)115
Between 2013 and 2015, the San Francisco Sherriff’s Department effectuated
9,312 arrests for driving with a license that had been suspended for a reason
other than driving safety. Black people made up an overwhelming proportion of
these arrests—they were overrepresented at a rate of 7.8x. (During this
timeframe, the San Francisco Sherriff’s Department also effectuated 855 arrests
pursuant to a warrant issued for FTP/FTA. People of color were also
disproportionately overrepresented for these arrests)116
Between January 2013 and March 2016 in San Joaquin County, California, 1,717
arrests were made for FTP/FTA and driving with a suspended license. Most
arrests had multiple booking charges, but forty percent—or 693—of these
arrests had no booking charges that were deemed serious offenses, i.e. acts that
reasonably endangered public safety. While the average jail time for these arrests
was 1.1 days, fifty-eight individuals spent more than three days in jail and
seventeen individuals spent more than ten days in jail for such arrests. 223
individuals, accounting for thirteen percent of the total arrests, were booked
solely on the charge of driving with a suspended license. These individuals spent
an average of 0.85 days—approximately 20 hours—in jail; however, three people
spent between ten and thirteen days in jail, and one individual spent twenty-one
days in jail, all for the singular offense of driving with a suspended license, where
the license was suspended for a reason that did not pose a threat to public
safety.117

If an individual is caught driving with a suspended license, which people of color
disproportionately are, they are charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor
vehicle (AUO), which entails an onslaught of even more additional fines, fees,
surcharges, and costs as well as possible imprisonment.118
BACK ON THE ROAD CALIFORNIA, Stopped, Fined, Arrested – Racial Bias in Policing and Traffic
Courts in California 13 (Apr. 2016), https://ebclc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_BOTRCA.pdf. Please note, there appears to be a
typo in this source. The data following the text on page 13 demonstrates rates of over and underrepresentation for arrests made for driving with a suspended license in Los Angeles County, but the text
preceding the data mistakenly refers to “San Francisco County” in the second paragraph.
116 Id. at 16–18.
117 Id. at 20.
118 When people are arrested for driving with a suspended license, they are often handcuffed for hours,
and once detained may wait as long as forty-eight hours—the constitutional limit—to be seen by a judge.
BACK ON THE ROAD CALIFORNIA, supra note 115 at 28. However, sometimes, “administrative or
bureaucratic errors can undermine the timeliness by which an arrestee avails himself of this fundamental
constitutional right.” Id. These police detentions have negative psychological impacts on individuals that
can last long beyond the arrest and detention. Further, as arrests are unplanned, they pull people from
their daily responsibilities and therefore cause people to miss work, lose their jobs, go without needed
medical treatment or care, and also render them unable to tend to their children. Even once a person is
115
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For AUO in the third degree, the charge for a first offense, New York law assesses a fine
between $200–$500, or imposes up to thirty days’ imprisonment; it also allows for both
the fine and imprisonment.119 For AUO in the second degree, which a person is charged
with if they committed an AUO in the preceding eighteen months or have three or more
FTP/FTA suspensions,120 New York law assesses a fine of at least $500 and also requires
a term of imprisonment or probation.121 Because AUO in the third and second degree
are misdemeanors, a mandatory $175 surcharge and $25 crime victim assistance fee are
also assessed—the court has no discretion to waive the surcharges or fees.122 For AUO
in the first degree, the charge if a person commits an AUO in the third degree and has
ten or more FTP/FTA suspensions,123 New York law assesses a fine between $500–
$5,000 and requires a term of imprisonment or probation.124 This is a felony and so a
$300 mandatory surcharge and $25 crime victim assistance fee are also assessed.125
Not only do AUO charges related to FTP/FTA suspensions needlessly incarcerate
people for their poverty, they also serve to entrench the debt trap, as discussed above.126
The fines, fees, and surcharges are then compounded by the higher insurance premiums
one will have to pay if they are found guilty of driving with a suspended license.127
In short, suspensions for non-driving safety reasons needlessly lead to AUO pleas and
convictions that generate criminal records that most otherwise would not have. By virtue
of AUOs producing a criminal record, Traffic Debt suspensions serve to foreclose even
more employment opportunities, further exacerbating the financial impact of a driver’s
license suspension. Traffic Debt suspensions essentially create a “gateway to jail,
probation, additional fines, and a criminal record for some of [New York’s] most
vulnerable.”128

released from detainment, they are then compelled “to navigate a confusing and complex court process,
pay attorney’s fees and court fees, and decide whether to plead guilty to a misdemeanor offense of driving
with a suspended license, which comes with a litany of additional penalties.” Id. at 29. (Note, in New York,
AUO in the first degree is a felony offense.) Jail time and hefty fines attach if one pleads guilty to driving
with a suspended license in New York, even for a first offense.
119 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(1)(b).
120 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(2)(a)(i), (iv).
121 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(2)(b). If a person is charged with AUO in the second degree for
committing an AUO in the preceding eighteen months, a term of imprisonment must be imposed and it
must not exceed 180 days. If a person is charged with AUO in the second degree because they have three
or more FTP/FTA suspensions, the term of imprisonment must be at least seven days, but is also capped
at 180 days. Id.
122 N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a)(ii); People v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 730, 47 N.E.3d 710 (2016).
123 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(3)(a)(ii).
124 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(3)(b).
125 N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a)(i).
126 See supra Section IV.a.
127 BACK ON THE ROAD CALIFORNIA, supra note 115 at 29.
128 Id.
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c. Endangers Public Safety
When driver’s licenses are suspended for non-safety reasons, such as Traffic Debt
suspensions, public safety is at risk. Such suspensions reduce the number of insured
drivers on the road and divert significant public safety resources.
Traffic Debt suspensions unnecessarily increase the number of unlicensed and uninsured
drivers on the road, thereby jeopardizing public safety. This is the case because many
suspended drivers must drive despite their license suspension to get to work and medical
appointments, drop their kids off at school, and make their court dates, and people
convicted of driving with a suspended license often lose their insurance coverage.
Further, for reinstated drivers, insurance premiums often become cost prohibitive as
they are higher for previously suspended drivers, regardless of the underlying reason for
the suspension (as driving records do not always distinguish between suspensions due to
unsafe driving behaviors and other reasons).129
Traffic Debt suspensions also divert already limited law enforcement, DMV, and court
resources from drivers that pose a true threat to public safety.130 The only logical reason
to suspend an individual’s driver’s license is if that individual poses a threat to public
safety—i.e., if they are a dangerous driver. In fact, driver’s license suspensions were first
instituted for the purposes of removing dangerous drivers from the road, changing risky
driving behaviors, and punishing unsafe drivers.131 Though social nonconformance
related suspensions132 were later introduced in an effort “to change non-highway safety
related” behaviors, “no empirical evidence . . . indicates that suspending a person’s
driving privilege for social nonconformance reasons is effective in gaining compliance
with the reason for the original non-driving suspension.”133 According to the American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, these social nonconformance related
suspensions are ineffective and counterproductive: they have “dramatically increased the
number of suspended drivers on our roads” and created “a tremendous burden on law
enforcement, [DMVs], the courts, and local communities.”134
Traffic Debt suspensions are not for dangerous driving; they are for nonpayments and
nonappearances. Given that drivers suspended for non-safety reasons represent the vast
majority of all suspended drivers in New York135 and that “most drivers with suspended
licenses pose no more of a threat to public safety than validly licensed drivers,”136 this
misallocation of resources is the true public safety threat with which we should be

Aiken, supra note 94.
U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 89 at 36–38.
131 AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 104 at 4.
132 “Examples of social non-conformance violations include fuel piracy/theft, failure to pay taxes, minor in
possession of alcohol, false public alarm, illegal solid waste burning, vandalism, failure to pay alimony,
selling alcohol to a minor, truancy, unlawful possession of firearms, prostitution, and many more.” Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Alcorn, supra note 5.
136 Brief for Fines and Fees Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kansas v.
Glover, 139 S. Ct. 1445, 203 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2019) (No. 18-1556), 2019 WL 4302286.
129
130

29

concerned.137 This is particularly so in New York because we know two thirds of all
driver’s license suspensions are issued for FTP/FTA—reasons wholly unrelated to
driver dangerousness.138
Indeed, when an already overburdened police force must use finite resources and
expend significant staff hours to pull over, transport, often jail, and attend court
dates with safe drivers who have been driving with a suspended license, it
decreases public safety. Judges, defense lawyers[,] and prosecutors are placed in a
similar situation. The time they spend dealing with otherwise safe drivers
inevitably eats into time that could be spent monitoring the roads for reckless
drivers and punishing those who could do the public serious harm.139
Law enforcement agencies expend millions of dollars and personnel hours each year to
administer suspensions issued for reasons unrelated to driving.140 For example:
• In Union County, Ohio it takes an average of nine hours to arrest and prosecute
an individual for driving with a suspended license.141
• It is estimated that Washington County State Patrol troopers expend over 79,041
personnel hours each year “in the arrest and adjudication of drivers caught
driving while suspended for non-highway safety related reasons.”142
The financial and personnel costs to DMVs are also substantial and cause them to
“operate outside their core mission of ensuring highway safety.”143 For instance:
• The Colorado DMV estimated it would expend 8,566 manual employee hours—
equating to 4.22 full time employees—to process social nonconformance related
suspensions, and 10,080 hearing officer hours—equating to 4.84 full time hearing
officers—to hold hearings and issue findings in social nonconformance related
suspension cases.144
Courts are likewise already overburdened with more cases for the number of judges
available; the addition of cases for driving while suspended as a result of a non-safety
violation simply compounds that burden.145 Similarly, non-safety suspension cases take
up a substantial amount of public defenders’ time. For instance, in 2017, low-level

“Law enforcement, the courts and the DMVs could better focus on drivers arrested for impaired
driving, aggressive driving, serious traffic violations, and other risky behavior if they were not required to
take action against individuals suspended for social nonconformance related offenses.” AM. ASS’N OF
MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 104 at 8.
138 Alcorn, supra note 5.
139 Ewan Watt, Common Sense on Crime and Driver’s Licenses: Column, USA TODAY (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.usatoday. com/story/opinion/2017/03/02/dont-suspend-drivers-licenses-for-no-goodreason-column/98481984.
140 AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 104 at 14.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 14–15.
143 Id. at 16–22.
144 Id. at 18.
145 Id. at 14.
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suspension cases made up about fifteen percent of the Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo’s
total caseload.146
These costs incurred by law enforcement, DMVs, judges, and lawyers are without any
benefits. Drivers whose license are suspended for unpaid debt are not unsafe drivers,
and non-driving safety related suspensions have proven to be ineffective in achieving
their purposes.147 In brief, “[t]he costs of arresting, processing, administering, and
enforcing social nonconformance related driver license suspensions create a significant
strain on budgets and other resources and detract from highway and public safety
priorities.”148 Traffic Debt suspensions therefore imprudently divert law enforcement to
handle issues involving poverty, rather than focusing on true safety issues such as
dangerous driving and serious crime.
d. Harms the Economy
Not only do driver’s license suspensions threaten individual financial stability, they also
have ramifications for the economy at large. Job losses flowing from driver’s license
suspensions have a profoundly negative impact on both GDP and tax revenue. And as
driver’s license suspensions are an ineffective collections tactic, they likely do nothing to
offset these negative impacts. Furthermore, driver’s license suspensions harm employers,
which in turn also contributes to decreased GDP and tax revenue.
A study of a driver’s license reinstatement program in Phoenix, Arizona found that the
median annual income loss as a result of driver’s license suspensions was $36,800. This
resulted in decreased GDP and tax revenue as there are positive correlations between
low unemployment and GDP and tax revenue. To this end, the study further found that
after the driver’s licenses of the 7,000 program participants were reinstated, they
collectively gained 1,904 job years of employment149 and $87 million in labor income,
which, due to individuals’ reinstated ability to earn and spend money, resulted in a $149.6
million increase in GDP. Likewise, the $87 million in labor income positively impacted
state income tax revenue given the positive correlation between low unemployment rates
and tax revenue.150
Moreover, driver’s license suspensions are an ineffective collections tactic and therefore
do nothing to benefit the government’s fiscal coffers or offset the economic harm of
Traffic Debt suspensions. Because people who do not have the money to pay simply
cannot pay it, nearly half of suspensions issued in 2016 in New York remained in effect
one year later.151 By way of further example, Tulsa County state courts have levied $209.3
million in fines and court costs on individuals for traffic, misdemeanor, and felony cases
since 2008. Yet, as of mid-2019, $157.8 million—about three quarters of the original
amount levied—is still owed. It is hardly a coincidence that residents living in the zip
McLeod, supra note 109..
See infra Section IV.d.
148 AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 104 at 2.
149 One job year is defined as the employment of one person for twelve consecutive months. L. WILLIAM
SEIDMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 96 at 5 n.3.
150 L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 96.
151 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
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codes that owe the most in court fines and fees are comprised of some of the poorest
residents in the county and are largely communities of color.152
Employers too are harmed when driver’s licenses are suspended because they are forced
to “hire and train new workers every time an employee is fired because he or she is
unable to drive to work.”153 Hiring and re-training a new person for a job that was being
performed well by someone else entails a cost in and of itself.154 Losing a qualified,
productive employee results in a financial loss to the employer as the resources and
training the employer invested in the employee become a sunk cost if the employee is no
longer able to perform job duties due to their driver’s license suspension. Moreover,
non-safety suspensions unnecessarily diminish the available labor force, making certain
jobs unnecessarily difficult for employers to fill. For example, a driver’s license is often a
prerequisite for employment in industries such as construction, home health care, motor
vehicle sales and services, and delivery services.155 As a consequence of Traffic Debt
suspensions, these industries suffer in terms of productivity for they cannot fill open
positions due to the needlessly narrowed labor pool, as do the governments that benefit
from taxable revenue and the constituents these industries serve.
In sum, Traffic Debt suspensions strike a hard and wide-reaching economic blow to the
economy, governments, and employers alike.
V.

Grave Lack of Traffic-Stop Data in New York is Problematic

The lack of available traffic-stop data is problematic and, in many ways, hinders effective
policing.156 Currently, New York law does not require law enforcement agencies to
collect and maintain data with respect to traffic stops and persons patted down, frisked,
and searched.157 Although a Senate bill from the 2017-2018 Legislative Session,
highlighting New York legislators’ concern for racially discriminatory policing practices,
would have required the collection and publication of data on traffic stops, the bill
regrettably did not make it out of Committee. The justification for the bill read as
follows:

Curtis Killman & Tim Stanley, Unpaid court fees disproportionately impact north Tulsa leaving
residents 'entrapped' in debt, analysis shows, TULSA WORLD (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/specialreports-databases/unpaid-court-fees-disproportionatelyimpacts-north-tulsa-leaving-residents-entrapped/article_fa02e372-25ef-512e-829f-742f12979e7d.html.
153 Harmann Singh, Challenging Unconstitutional Driver’s License Suspensions, U. OF PENN. CAREY L.
SCH. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/7910-challenging-unconstitutional-driverslicense.
154 Bender, supra note 99 at 18.
155 Id. at 17–18.
156 See, e.g., POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U, It’s Time to Start Collecting Stop Data: A Case for
Comprehensive Statewide Legislation (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.policingproject.org/newsmain/2019/9/27/its-time-to-start-collecting-stop-data-a-case-for-comprehensive-statewide-legislation.
157 The New York State Police did, however, comply with the Stanford Open Policing Project’s request for
traffic-stop data. It reported 7,962,169 stops from December 2009 through December 2017, and included
limited data, such as the drivers’ race. Pierson, supra note 30.
152
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Blacks [sic], Hispanics and other minority groups have long been victims of
biased and unjustified vehicle stops, searches and frisks by law enforcement
officers. The arguably unconstitutional use of race or ethnicity as a criterion [sic]
has become the focus of many civil and human rights groups. The practice is
commonly known as "racial profiling." The use of racial profiling has
consequently had a corrosive effect on the relations between police and tile
minority communities. This practice deprives minorities of their Fourth
Amendment right to be [sic] free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
their right to be free from discriminations based on race guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the [U.S.] Constitution. 158
As at least some New York legislators have evidently recognized, data regarding racial
profiling in traffic stops are limited.159 As of September 2019, nineteen states required
the collection of data on every law enforcement initiated traffic stop.160 When traffic-stop
data are available, society at large benefits from increased transparency and
accountability, which in turn also promotes better policing.
a. Lack of Data Thwarts Transparency and Accountability
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 decision that held police could use any traffic offense as
a reason to stop motorists (i.e., pretextual stops) effectively gave law enforcement the
green light to disproportionately stop people of color.161 The N.Y. Court of Appeals has
acknowledged that racial disparities exist in law enforcement stop practices and has
pronounced that “[d]iscriminatory law enforcement has no place in our law.”162 Yet,
S. 2146, An act to amend the executive law, in relation to ethnic or racial profiling, 2017–2018 Reg.
Sess. New York City Council member Donovan Richards has also proposed a bill that would require the
NYPD to issue a quarterly report on all vehicle stops. Int 1671-2019, A Local Law to amend the
administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to requiring the police department to report on
traffic encounters, 2019 Reg. Sess.
159 Indeed, in a 2014 report the NAACP noted:
Since the 2004 AIUSA poll on racial profiling and the 2011 DOJ survey of traffic and pedestrian
stops, no new data on profiling on a nationwide level exists. Many police departments, either
voluntarily or to meet specific legislative mandates or other legal obligations, collect data on racial
profiling. However, this data is not always readily available to the public and it is not compiled to
offer national statistics. Often, these numbers can be accessed on a local level—usually through
years of advocacy and submissions of Freedom of Information Act requests. The fight to end
racial profiling in New York City, in fact, was based on the data that advocates were able to
access on stop-and-frisk numbers spanning over a decade.
NATIONAL ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, Born Suspect: Stop-and-Frisk Abuses
& the Continued Fight to End Racial Profiling in America 9 (Sept. 2014),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/naacp/Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf.
160 POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U, supra note 156.
161 Whren v. United States, 571 U.S. 896 (1996); Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial
Discrimination: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993,
1005–06 (2016) (“[T]he decision in effect authorizes racial profiling in run-of-the-mill traffic stops, a
common modern law-enforcement technique. By many accounts, racial profiling currently is routine
among state and local police in jurisdictions across the United States. It has become an integral tool
employed in the much-maligned, yet nevertheless aggressively enforced, ‘war on drugs.’”)
162 People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 352 (2001).
We are not unmindful of studies, some of which are cited by defendants and the amici, which
show that certain racial and ethnic groups are disproportionately stopped by police officers, and
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racial data on traffic stops are seldom collected and these practices continue to persist, at
least in part, due to the lack of transparency and accountability.
Transparency—and the collection and analysis of data—is key to understanding how
policing works in all of our communities. It promotes accountability, and in turn fosters
policing that serves all members of our communities effectively—i.e., good law
enforcement. The DOJ has recognized this in its evaluations of the Suffolk County
Police Department (SCPD). In an assessment of the SCPD’s compliance with the
parties’ settlement agreement, it noted that the “collection of meaningful and accurate
traffic stop data” is critical to “ensuring that policing services are delivered in a manner
free from bias.”163 The DOJ has further explained:
By collecting the necessary data, and periodically analyzing that data, the [DOJ]
will be able to ensure that [the SCPD] is conducting traffic stops in a race-neutral
and non-discriminatory manner. A robust bias-free training for all officers and
recruits is also necessary to train them to better identify implicit biases and to
incorporate the principles of procedural justice in interactions with the diverse
communities they serve. . . . [T]hese requirements are fundamental to the
continued delivery of bias-free policing. . . .164
Similarly, data that a court compelled the New York Police Department (NYPD) to turn
over as a result of the settlement agreement in Daniels et al. v. City of New York
revealed significant racial disparities in pedestrian-stop context—eighty-five person of
those subjected to stops by the NYPD were Black or Latinx, while only ten percent were
white—and resulted in the Floyd litigation.165 In Floyd, the court ultimately found that

that those stops do not end in the discovery of a higher proportion of contraband than in the
cars of other groups. The fact that such disparities exist is cause for both vigilance and concern
about the protections given by the New York State Constitution. Discriminatory law
enforcement has no place in our law.
Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
163 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THIRD REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE
BY SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEPARTMENT 7 (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download.
164 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SIXTH REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE BY
SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEP’T 6 (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download.
Without doubt, bias-free policing is more effective policing. Removing bias from policing benefits both
the citizenry and law enforcement. Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for
"Community Engagement" Provisions in Doj Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 802 (2016)
(“when police processes are perceived as procedurally just, communities are more likely to cooperate with
the police, and policing, in turn, is more effective”). Not only is bias-free policing a much better use of
limited public resources because it ensures law enforcement focuses its efforts on true public safety
threats, it also fosters trust and relationships between the police and the communities they serve.
Christopher N. Lasch et. al., Understanding "Sanctuary Cities, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1761 (2018)
(“Community trust is critical for effective policing programs.”). It protects citizens against unconstitutional
government encroachments while allowing for more effective crime prevention. Thus, the availability of
data also stimulates better law enforcement practices, which in turn bolstering the public’s faith in our law
enforcement institutions.
165 CATALYSTS FOR COLLABORATION, Case Study: Floyd v. City of New York,
https://catalystsforcollaboration.org/casestudy/nycfloyd.html (last visited Jan 2., 2020).
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the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices were violative of the Equal Protection Clause.166
The plaintiffs were able to prove that the City, through the NYPD, had a policy of racial
profiling by relying on data that demonstrated that: “the NYPD carries out more stops
where there are more [B]lack and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables
are held constant,” “NYPD officers are more likely to stop [B]lacks and Hispanics than
whites within precincts and census tracts, even after controlling for other relevant
variables” and “are more likely to use force against blacks and Hispanics than whites,
after controlling for other relevant variables, and that “NYPD officers stop [B]lacks and
Hispanics with less justification than whites.”167 But for the data that compelled these
factual findings, it is hard to say whether the court would have reached the conclusion it
ultimately came to,168 and ordered the reforms that it did.169
In short, the role of data in Floyd cannot be understated. The patent racial disparities the
Floyd litigation uncovered in the pedestrian-stop context evince the need for analogous
data in the traffic-stop context, not only for the sake of transparency and accountability,
but also to ensure effective policing. It is incumbent upon New York policymakers to
utilize the lessons learned from Ferguson and Floyd—and across the nation—and
require the collection and analysis of data with respect to all police stops. It should not
take lawsuits and settlement agreements for law enforcement to be transparent and held
to account. Relevant data should be made publicly available and law enforcement should
be analyzing and engaging with such data in a manner that fosters better and more just
law enforcement practices.170
166
167

Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 661 (emphasis in original).

168

The Equal Protection Clause does not sanction treating similarly situated members of different
racial groups differently based on racial disparities in crime data. Indeed, such treatment would
eviscerate the core guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. If equal protection means
anything, it means that individuals may not be punished or rewarded based on the government's
views regarding their racial group, regardless of the source of those views. . . . The Equal
Protection Clause's prohibition on selective enforcement means that suspicious [B]lacks and
Hispanics may not be treated differently by the police than equally suspicious whites. Individuals
of all races engage in suspicious behavior and break the law. Equal protection guarantees that
similarly situated individuals of these races will be held to account equally.
Id. at 667.
169 Floyd resulted in a host of policing reforms. Among other things, the court: (1) ordered the NYPD to
institute a pilot program that required “officers on patrol in one precinct per borough—specifically the
precinct with the highest number of stops during 2012” to wear body cameras to record street encounters
as a potential tool for accountability; (2) appointed an independent monitor to engage in direct oversight
of the reform process; and (3) initiated a joint remedial process to solicit additional solutions from various
impacted stakeholders on how the NYPD should further reform its policing practices. Floyd v. City of
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 676, 685–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
170 See, e.g., SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Police and Data Collection: Why Louisiana Needs
Reform (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/20181115/police-and-data-collection-why-louisiananeeds-reform.
Good governance is just as dependent on data. Governments constantly collect, analyze, and
disseminate data to keep the public informed about everything from economic trends to the
projected paths of hurricanes, from comparisons of student loan options to the spread of
infectious diseases. If government policies are not data-driven, it is hard for government to be
effective. It is no surprise, then, that data are just as important to policing as they are to the rest
of daily life. . . . Providing public access to data also increases transparency and helps build trust
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b. Availability of Data Drives Better Policing Practices
There is also real evidence that proves that when data are made available, better policing
practices follow:
As a result of the traffic-stop data collection practices mandated by the SCPD’s
settlement agreement with the DOJ, it’s bias-free policing practices have improved
considerably, though there is still much more that must be done.171 Similarly, as discussed
above, after the settlement agreement in Daniels required the NYPD to provide stopand-frisk data on a quarterly basis from 2003 to 2007, the significant racial disparities
uncovered led to the commencement of Floyd, which ultimately resulted in courtordered “NYPD reform practices and policies related to stop and frisk to conform with
the requirements of the [U.S.] Constitution.”.172
Likewise, in Maryland, when the state police, pursuant to a settlement agreement, were
required to maintain statistics on the race and ethnicity of drivers stopped, racial
disparities in traffic stops were cut in half.173 In Illinois, where law enforcement agencies
have been required to document and report traffic stops to the Illinois Department of
Transportation since 2004, law enforcement agencies are able to assess the effectiveness
and unintended consequences of their strategies, and compare themselves to each other
to improve practices.174 A consent decree between New Jersey and the DOJ, which
required “the design and implementation of management information system to compile
data on the patterns of enforcement and the outcomes of vehicle stops and searches,”
led to extensive reforms in the training and supervision of state police troopers. 175
However, because of data, we know that there is still much work to be done as despite
seven years under the consent decree, data has shown that the New Jersey State Police

Id.

with the communities served by law enforcement, which is important for developing
collaborative solutions to reduce crime. . . . In contrast, when police do not make data available,
this frustrates public accountability and effective police work. As a former FBI director put it in
2015 when responding to a question from a member of Congress about police uses of force,
“[W]e can’t have an informed discussion because we don’t have data. People have data about
who went to a movie last weekend or how many books were sold or how many cases of the flu
walked into an emergency room, and I cannot tell you how many people were shot by police in
the United States last month, last year, or anything about the demographics, and that’s a very bad
place to be."

Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THIRD REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE
BY SUFFOLK CTY, POLICE DEP’T (April 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download with
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEVENTH REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE BY
SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEP’T (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download.
172 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 671; CATALYSTS FOR COLLABORATION, Case Study:
171

Floyd v. City of New York, https://catalystsforcollaboration.org/casestudy/nycfloyd.html (last visited Jan.
2, 2020).
173 Michael A. Fletcher, The Stop: Racial profiling of drivers leaves legacy of anger and fear, THE
UNDEFEATED, https://theundefeated.com/features/the-stop-national-geographic-anquan-boldin-racialprofiling-of-drivers-leaves-legacy-of-anger (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). Note, the racial disparities were cut in
half after a second lawsuit which compelled the police to revamp their complaint system. Id.
174 ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, https://illinoistrafficstops.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
175 J. Fagan & A.B. Geller, Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches and Seizures after Soto, Presented at the
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Oct. 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641326.
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were still involved in a pattern and practice of racially selective enforcement on the New
Jersey Turnpike and other nearby state highways.176 In Los Angeles, where a report
revealed that from 2015 to 2018, the LAPD’s Metropolitan Division stopped Black
drivers “at a rate more than five times their share of the city’s population,”177 the Mayor,
in response to the data in the report, ordered the LAPD to scale back traffic stops—the
LAPD scaled back by about eleven percent, and its Metropolitan Division by about
forty-five percent.178
In the legislative context, North Carolina was the first state in the nation to mandate the
collection of traffic-stop data. As a result of that law, researchers were able to validate
the racial profiling concerns of the lawmakers who enacted it: “two-to-one search rates;
two-to-one increased likelihood of being pulled over if you are nonwhite.”179 A number
of reforms have been implemented in large part based on the analysis of data that law
enforcement agencies are statutorily required to produce.180
These examples of data serving as an impetus for better policing practices make a
compelling case for New York to mandate the collection and analysis of stop data.
VI.

New York’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme is Vulnerable to
Possible Legal Challenges

a. Fourteenth Amendment181
New York’s driver’s license suspension scheme punishes individuals for Traffic Debt—
in other words, it punishes people for poverty. It also disproportionately impacts people
of color. Such a practice presents serious constitutional issues.

Id.
Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, ‘Stop-and-frisk in a car:’ Elite LAPD unit disproportionately stopped black
drivers, data show, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019 11:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-melapd-traffic-stops-20190124-story.html.
178 Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, LAPD searches blacks and Latinos more. But they’re less likely to have
contraband than whites., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-lapd-searches-20190605-story.html; Cindy Chang & Ben Boston, Garcetti orders LAPD to scale back
vehicle stops amid concerns over black drivers being targeted, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019, 9:30 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-garcetti-lapd-metro-20190206-story.html.
179 Isidoro Rodriguez, Why Traffic Stops Don’t Stop Crime, CENTER ON MEDIA CRIME AND JUSTICE AT
JOHN JAY COLLEGE (July 17, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/07/17/why-traffic-stops-dont-stopcrime/.
180 See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, NC Traffic Stops,
https://fbaum.unc.edu/traffic.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). For example, as a result of the North
Carolina law mandating the collection of traffic-stop data, “several jurisdictions revised their practices . . .
including requiring officers to obtain written consent before searching a car during a traffic stop.”
POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U, supra note 156.
181 It should be noted that following lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of license-for-payment laws,
several jurisdictions changed their laws. These jurisdictions include California, Montana, and Virginia. See,
e.g., Hernandez v. Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. RG16836460 (Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., filed
Oct. 25, 2016) (California); DiFrancesco v. Bullock, No. CV-17-66-BU-SEH (D. Mont., filed Aug. 31,
2017) (Montana); Stinnie v. Holcomb, No. 3:16-cv-44 (W.D. Va., filed July 6, 2016) (Virginia).
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i.
Fundamental Fairness
“All people . . . must, so far as the law is concerned, stand on an equality before the bar
of justice. . . .”182 Indeed, punishing a person “simply because he could not pay [a] fine,
without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the
fine or extending the time for payments or making alternative orders,” is “little more
than punishing a person for his poverty.”183 In a long line of cases in which the U.S.
Supreme Court has evaluated the impact of money in the justice system, it has eschewed
the application of the traditional due process and equal protection tiered approach, and
has instead adopted the more nuanced doctrine of fundamental fairness—a convergence
of due process and equal protection principles.184
The Court’s fundamental fairness doctrine does not tolerate laws that punish people for
their inability to pay.185 When considering economic disparities in the justice system, the
Court’s fundamental fairness approach requires an inquiry into: (1) the nature of the
individual interest affected and the extent to which it is affected; (2) the rationality of the
connection between legislative means and purpose; and (3) the existence of alternative
means for effectuating the purpose.186 This paper analyzes these considerations, as
applied to New York’s driver’s license suspension scheme, in turn.
First, driver’s licenses are a property right protected by the U.S. Constitution.187 Further,
“driving an automobile [is] a virtual necessity for most Americans,”188 and thus the
nature of an individual’s interest in their driver’s license and the extent to which the
interest is affected could not be more sweeping. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that
“the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity which it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”189 The ability to drive is essential for many people
to go about their lives and earn a living. When one’s license is suspended for FTP/FTA,
the individual is outright prohibited from driving and is therefore precluded from going
about their daily activities and obligations, particularly if they reside in an area with

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). The principles from Griffin and its progeny extend beyond
instances in which a defendant is subject to imprisonment. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111 (1996).
183 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671, 674 (1983). Indeed, unpaid fines and fees often result in civil
judgments, which entail significant human and financial consequences for those who cannot pay because
of their poverty and therefore blamelessly fail to pay the judgments. People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th
1157, 1167–68 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (Mar. 27, 2019). The consequences of driver’s license
suspensions are analogous to, and as serious and punitive as, the consequences that flow from civil
judgments. Therefore, Traffic Debt suspensions should be analyzed within the same framework as unpaid
fines and fees that result in civil judgments.
184 See, e.g., M.L.B, 519 U.S. 102; Bearden, 461 U.S. 660; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 259–266 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
185 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67, 670–71; Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th at 1164.
186 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
187 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”) The Court also recognized that the
continued possession of a driver’s license can be “essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” Id. at 539.
188 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
189 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). See also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999).
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limited public transportation options.190 Moreover, a choice between paying a fine which
one cannot afford to pay and having one’s driver license—which is integral to go about
one’s life and earn a livelihood—suspended is really no choice at all.191 As one court has
explained:
[T]he ability to drive is crucial to the debtor’s ability to actually establish the
economic self-sufficiency that is necessary to be able to pay the relevant
obligations. . . . [O]ne needs only to observe the details of ordinary life to
understand that an individual who cannot drive is at an extraordinary
disadvantage in both earning and maintaining material resources. Suspending a
driver’s license is therefore not merely out of proportion to the underlying
purpose of ensuring payment, but affirmatively destructive of that end.”192
Considering that New York’s law can completely deprive people of the judicially
recognized vital property interest in their driver’s licenses, the nature of the interest and
the extent to which it is affected indicate that the law should be held to be fundamentally
unfair.
Second, New York’s license-for-payment law is wholly irrational. The State might argue
two grounds for rationality—that the law enables it to collect outstanding debt and helps
to ensure the safety of roads—neither of which would hold up in a rationality analysis.
The fact that nearly half of the Traffic Debt suspensions issued in New York in 2016
remained in effect one year later193 compels the conclusion that it is impossible, and
therefore irrational, to expect that the suspending someone’s driver’s license will coerce
one who cannot afford to pay to do so.194 Save for a sudden and unlikely change in
financial circumstances, the draconian threat of driver’s license suspension does not
suddenly give someone who lacks the ability to pay the ability to pay.195 What the Court
said in Bearden with respect to revoking the probation of indigent defendants is highly
190

See supra Section IV.a.
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The “choice” of paying $100 fine or spending 30 days in jail is really no choice at all to the person
who cannot raise $100. The resulting imprisonment is no more or no less than imprisonment for
being poor. To put it in another way and in the context of the present case, when a fine in the
same amount is imposed upon codefendants deemed equally culpable with the added provision
for their imprisonment in the event of its nonpayment, an option is given to the rich defendant
but denied to the poor one. While the poor man has the “right” to obtain his release by payment
of the fine, in actuality the “right” is meaningless to him.
In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 108 (1970). This case was approvingly cited by the Bearden Court. Bearden,
461 U.S. at 664–69 n.6, n.10.
192 Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-CV-1263, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).
193 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
194 Suspending a driver’s license is “affirmatively destructive” to the purpose of ensuring payment.
Robinson, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9.; People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1164 (Ct. App. 2019),
review denied (Mar. 27, 2019) (“The laws, moreover, are irrational: they raise no money because people
who cannot pay do not pay.”).
195 See, e.g., Robinson, 2017 WL 4418134, at *8 (“No person, however, can be threatened or coerced into
doing the impossible, and no person can be threatened or coerced into paying money that she does not
have and cannot get.”).
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applicable here.196 While punishment, such as imprisonment or driver’s license
suspension
may indeed spur [individuals] to try hard to pay, . . . [s]uch a goal is fully served
. . . by [suspending a license] only for persons who have not made sufficient bona
fide efforts to pay. [Suspending the driver’s license] of someone who through no
fault of his own is unable to make [payments] will not make [payments] suddenly
forthcoming. Indeed, such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the
[individual] to use illegal means [such as driving with a suspended license] to
acquire funds to pay in order to avoid [permanent suspension].197
Rather than facilitating the collection of outstanding debt, New York’s driver’s license
suspension scheme effectively leaves impoverished individuals—who are
disproportionately people of color—with no choice but to continue driving despite the
suspension of their license and thus risk getting arrested, charged, and convicted for
driving with a suspended license. This is counterproductive in that it results in the
accumulation of more unpayable and uncollectable outstanding traffic-related debt, as
well as criminal justice debt.198 As one court put it, “taking an individual’s driver’s license
away to try to make her more likely to pay a fine is not using a shotgun to do the job of a
rifle: it is using a shotgun to treat a broken arm. There is no rational basis for that.”199
Although collecting outstanding debt may very well be a legitimate state purpose, a law
that is so plainly counterproductive to achieving said purpose is not rational.
Further, the law authorizing Traffic Debt suspensions is not rationally related to any
legitimate state interest in ensuring the safety of roadways. For it to be rationally related
to such interest, the “underlying law[] would have to draw some distinction based on
actual expectation of safety risk, such as, for example, a distinction based on the severity
or numerousness of the underlying offenses.”200 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a)
authorize suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances in traffic
court— reasons that have absolutely no correlation with driver dangerousness.201 There
is zero evidence to suggest that drivers who cannot pay traffic tickets and related costs
pose any more of a risk to drivers around them than drivers who can afford to pay such
tickets and related costs. In fact, if the law’s purpose is to ensure the safety of roadways,
the law actually frustrates its own purpose: it makes roadways less safe insofar as it
inevitably increases the number of unlicensed and uninsured drivers on the road, and
also makes it much more difficult for drivers who have their license reinstated to procure
insurance. 202
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670–71 (1983).
Id.
198 See supra Section IV.a–b.
199 Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-CV-1263, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).
200 Id. at *8.
201 See, e.g., Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn. 2d 208, 231 (Wash. 2006) (Sanders, J., dissenting)
(stating that “revocation of a driver's license for a reason completely unrelated to the only legitimate police
power justification [(to promote highway safety)] for the license in the first place violates due process” and
“the legitimate end of licensing drivers to promote highway safety does not justify the means of revoking a
driver's license to deter delinquency in child support”).
202 See supra Section III.c.
196
197
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The law’s lack of a rational relation to the State’s interests in collecting outstanding debt
and ensuring the safety of roadways counsels that the law should be found
fundamentally unfair.
Third, several alternative—and more effective—means exist to effectuate the purpose of
collecting outstanding debt. However, New York’s current statutory framework is
devoid of options that might make it feasible for low-income individuals to pay the fines
and fees imposed upon them.
Only if alternate measures are not adequate to meet the State's interests . . . may
the court [punish an indigent individual] who has made sufficient bona fide
efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the [individual] of his . . . freedom
simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a
deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the
Fourteenth Amendment.203
New York law could allow for reduced, waived, or deferred payments for traffic tickets,
for instance. Similarly, it could allow for partial payments or payment plans, or
community service or other alternatives. These options are much more likely to result in
payment than driver’s license suspensions, especially because such alternatives do not
necessarily result in the additional financial impediments that suspensions entail.
The existence of ample means for the State to effectuate its purpose further confirms
that New Yorker’s driver’s license suspension scheme for Traffic Debt should be held to
be fundamentally unfair.
Moreover, New York courts have recognized the importance of the fundamental fairness
doctrine, and have applied it robustly to avoid punishing people for their poverty.204
Specifically, the N.Y. Court of Appeals has held that a judge’s failure to conduct an
ability to pay analysis prior to issuing an arrest warrant for an unpaid speeding ticket
violates the Supreme Court’s holding in Bearden.205 Similarly premised on Bearden, a
New York trial court recently found that “when imposing bail the court must consider
the defendant's ability to pay and whether there [are] any less restrictive means to achieve
the State's interest.”206
For these reasons, it can hardly be considered just, let alone constitutional, that New
York law permits indefinite Traffic Debt suspensions as punishment for “the crime of
being poor.” The infliction of punishment on individuals solely because of their poverty

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983).
California courts have done the same. In January 2019, a California appellate court held that imposing
fines and fees “upon indigent defendants without a determination that they have the present ability to pay .
. . [is] fundamentally unfair.” People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1169 (Ct. App. 2019), review
denied (Mar. 27, 2019).
205 Matter of Hamel, 88 N.Y.2d 317 (1996).
206 People ex rel. Desgranges On Behalf of Kunkeli v. Anderson, 59 Misc. 3d 238, 243 (Sup. Ct. 2018).
203
204
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is not tolerated by the courts.207 As this is precisely what New York’s Traffic Debt
suspension law does,208 it should be found fundamentally unfair
ii.
Equal Protection
Although the fundamental fairness doctrine—which the Supreme Court developed and
adopted to evaluate economic disparities in the justice system—should control the
inquiry, some courts have instead employed a more traditional equal protection analysis.
If a court were to analyze New York’s Traffic Debt suspension law using the tiered equal
protection approach, the law would likely be found unconstitutional.209
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”210 N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) could be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause for at
least two reasons. First, a court could find that there is a clear pattern, unexplainable on
grounds other than race, of a disproportionate impact on people of color, giving rise to a
strict scrutiny analysis. Second, a court could find that the law treats people who are
willing but unable to pay more harshly than people who are willing and able to pay, when
the only difference between such people is their poverty, giving rise to a rational basis
review analysis.
Strict Scrutiny
While intent is generally required for a cognizable equal protection claim, “discriminatory
purpose may be proven through statistics alone”211 where a “clear pattern, unexplainable
on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the
governing legislation appears neutral on its face.”212 Inadequate remedial efforts may also
demonstrate a discriminatory purpose.213
If a court finds the data presented here sufficiently compelling,214 it likely can serve as the
foundation for an equal protection claim premised on race. Further, when viewed against
the backdrop of the long history of unequal treatment that people of color have endured
in New York and throughout the United States,215 the data presented at the outset of this
Seee e.g., Bearden, 461 U.S. 660.
See supra Section IV.a–b.
209 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985) (while a city can in
some cases validly deny a permit to a proposed group home if the home would be too big, there was no
logical connection between that principle and the City’s actions, and thus the Court found that the law did
not survive rational basis review); Zobel v. Williams 457 U.S. 55, 56–58 (1982) (struck down a program
that distributed oil money to residents based on length of state residency because the asserted rationales
did not logically support the law);
210 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
211 Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), on reconsideration, 813 F. Supp.
2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
212 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (citing Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347
(1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
213 Floyd, 813 F. Supp. at 452–53.
214 See supra Section II.
215 See infra Section VI.c for a discussion on the historical use of fines as an abusive practice to subjugate
people of color.
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paper raises significant questions as to whether N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) could
survive an equal protection challenge.216
Rational Basis Review
Even if a court were to apply the most deferential standard—rational basis review—N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) is likely vulnerable to a judicial finding that it is
unconstitutional because the law treats similarly situated individuals differently on the
basis of poverty, and the different treatment fails to rationally further a legitimate
government interest.
The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to mean that “all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.”217 If a law treats similarly situated individuals
differently, and the different treatment is not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, the law is violative of the Equal Protection Clause.218 The Court’s wellestablished line of precedent dictates that a statute which penalizes defendants based
solely on their nonpayment of money, without providing for an exception if the
defendants are willing but unable to pay, is the “constitutional equivalent of a statute that
specifically imposes a harsher sanction on indigent defendants than on non-indigent
defendants.”219 Thus, despite judicial reluctance “‘to overturn governmental action on
the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws,’” when reviewing legislation for a
rational basis,220 the Court’s precedent indicates that the presumption of rationality does
not stretch far enough to allow for the disparate treatment of indigent defendants if the
only goal of the challenged law is to ensure payment and the harsher punishment
inflicted upon indigent defendants (relative to non-indigent defendants) makes it
substantially more difficult for indigent defendants to make payment.221
In James v. Strange, for example, the Court found that a state recoupment statute for
legal defense fees expended for the benefit of indigent defendants failed to evenly treat
indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors and discriminatorily
“blight[ed]” “the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and self-respect.”222 It therefore
found that the law “embodie[d] elements of punitiveness and discrimination which
violate[d] the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the law,” and thus upheld the
injunction enjoining the law’s enforcement.223

“It is deeply troubling if thousands of New Yorkers are being stopped each year without reasonable
suspicion, and even more troubling if African–American and Latino New Yorkers are being singled out
for such treatment.” Floyd, 813 F. Supp. at 423.
217 U. S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 169 (2d Cir.
2010) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)).
218 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533.
219 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
220 Hayden, 594 F.3d at 170 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470–71 (1991)).
221 See Bearden, 461 U.S. 660; Tate, 401 U.S. 395; Mayer, 404 U.S. 189; Williams, 399 U.S. 235; Roberts,
389 U.S. 40; Douglas, 372 U.S. 353; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12.
222 407 U.S. 128, 141–42 (1972).
223 Id. at 142.
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N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) should be found to violate the Equal Protection
Clause because it treats similarly situated people—people with outstanding traffic-related
debt—differently based on their ability to pay. More specifically, it punishes poor people
with the suspension of their driver’s license and the consequences that ensue therefrom,
but does not inflict such unduly harsh punishment on those with the means to pay. As
explained throughout this paper, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) permits suspensions
for FTP/FTA, but does not permit inquiry into the reasons for the nonpayment/
nonappearance, consideration of whether the requirement to repay will deprive an
individual and their family of their livelihood, nor the imposition of alternatives. The loss
of a driver’s license results in a cascade of hardship—whether it be job loss, additional
fines, fees, and costs, or a conviction for driving with a suspended license, for
example224—that people of means completely avoid by paying traffic tickets and related
costs in full. This kind of discriminatory treatment of similarly situated people is
proscribed by the Constitution when the treatment does not rationally further a
legitimate government interest.225
As discussed in depth above, the law should be found to not rationally further any
legitimate government interest because it does not result in the collection of outstanding
debt—it is actually counterproductive in that it impedes individuals’ ability to pay the
fines and fees underlying their Traffic Debt suspensions. Likewise, it does not make
roads safer; indeed, it actually has the perverse effect of making highways less safe.226
Therefore, because N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) discriminates between similarly
situated people, and such discriminatory treatment does not rationally further any
legitimate government interest, the law should not survive an Equal Protection challenge.
b. Implementing Regulations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial
assistance.”227 A crucial purpose for which Title VI was enacted was to prevent indirect,
but nonetheless invidious, discrimination through the use of federal funds.228 Federal
agencies that are empowered to provide federal financial assistance are authorized and
directed to effectuate Title VI by issuing rules, regulations, and orders of general
applicability.229 Federal grants, cooperative agreements, loans, and arrangements to use
federal property all qualify as federal assistance within the meaning of Title VI.230 If a
recipient of federal funds fails to comply with any requirement adopted by an agency
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, the agency must first inform the recipient of their
See supra Section IV. a–b.
Moreover, any plausible public benefit derived from the law is significantly outweighed by the
demonstrable harm. This also counsels that the law fails the rational basis test. See Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. County Commission, 488 U.S. 336, 343–46 (1989); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982).
226 See supra Section VI.a.ii.
227 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
228 See H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12 (1963); 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (Statement of
Sen. Humphrey); 110 Cong. Rec. 2468 (1964); 10 Cong. Rec. 7054 (1964) (Statement by Sen. Pastore).
229 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
230 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(c); 28 C.F.R. § 42.105.
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failure to comply and seek their compliance by voluntary means.231 If the recipient fails
to comply, the agency is then empowered to seek compliance through the termination of
assistance or refusal to grant continued assistance, or enforcement proceedings through
the courts.232
“Most [f]ederal agencies have adopted regulations that prohibit recipients of [f]ederal
funds from using criteria or methods of administering their programs that have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin.”233 Such regulations permissibly prohibit practices that have a disparate impact on
protected groups, even if the practices are not intentionally discriminatory,234 and carry
the full force and effect of law.235
Disparate impact is established by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group, in violation of
federal agency regulations, without a “substantial legitimate justification.”236 The
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
Id. See, e.g., Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215, 1221–22 (D.D.C. 1976).
233 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Title VI Legal Manual (Jan. 11, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/Title-6Manual (emphasis in original).
234 Id. “[R]egulations [promulgated under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1] may validly prohibit practices having a
disparate impact on protected groups, even if the actions or practices are not intentionally discriminatory.
Id. (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. at
287, 292–94 (1985); Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 7 F.3d 242 (11th Cir. 1993)).
235 Blackshear Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth. of City of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D. Tex. 1971)
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development regulation governing site selection for public
housing projects has force and effect of law, and constitutes a presumptively valid interpretation of
requirements of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964) (citing Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969)); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Ed., 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1967)
(Regulation of U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in carrying out obligation to see that
federal funds do not go to state supported programs in which there is discrimination based on race or
color has the force and effect of law).
236 Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 509 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, (2001) (citing Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1202 (11th Cir. 1999))
(internal quotation marks omitted); New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of N.Y., 71 F.3d 1031, 1038 (2d
Cir. 1995). In Sandoval, the court determined that the Alabama Department of Public Safety's official
policy of administering its driver's license examination only in the English language had a disparate impact
on basis of national origin, in violation of Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964. It further found that the
policy adversely affected individuals in form of lost opportunities, social services, and other quality of life
pursuits and that the vast majority of residents who could not obtain licenses because they were not
sufficiently fluent in English were from countries other than the United States. Id. at 508–11. While the
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to the extent that it held that there is no private
right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, it did not
address “whether the DOJ regulation was authorized by [42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1], or whether the [lower]
courts . . . were correct to hold that the English-only policy had the effect of discriminating on the basis of
national origin.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279, 293 (2001). Further, the DOJ itself has
explained that
although Sandoval foreclosed private judicial enforcement of Title VI disparate impact
regulations, it did not undermine the validity of those regulations or otherwise limit the authority
and responsibility of Federal grant agencies to enforce their own implementing regulations.
Therefore, the agencies' disparate impact regulations continue to be a vital administrative
enforcement mechanism.
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consequences of the allegedly discriminatory practice, rather than the motivations for it,
are the focus of disparate impact inquiry.237
i.
New York Accepts Federal Funds
New York State, its subdivisions, and its municipalities receive federal funding; thus, they
must comply with funding agency regulations that implement Title VI. If they do not
comply, complaints may be filed with the relevant funding agencies, which then
investigate the complaints and take appropriate action to ensure compliance.
In 2019, New York, its subdivisions, and its municipalities were collectively awarded
$180.1 billion in prime awards from federal agencies.238 Notably and relevant to driver’s
license suspensions, well over $65 billion of those funds were awarded by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT).239 In 2019, DOT issued more than 3,600 grants
totaling over $995 million to New York, its subdivisions, and its municipalities. 240 The
New York State DMV received a $647,500 prime award, 241 and six sub-awards totaling
over $27 million242 from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 2019.243
Moreover, the Governor’s Traffic Safety Committee (GTSC), which serves as a liaison
with federal government agencies on highway safety programs and policies, receives
federal funds which it appropriates to the DMV: in 2019, the GTSC received just south
of $20.5 million in federal funding, in addition to seventeen federally funded full-time
employees.244 Further, the DOJ issued eighteen Edward Byrne Memorial Justice
Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG)245 awards totaling $13,502,275 to entities within
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 233.
237 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 233 (citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974)).
238 USASPENDING NEW YORK FY 2019, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/state/36 (last visited Dec. 9,
2019).
239 USASPENDING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AMOUNTS OBLIGATED TO NEW YORK FY 2019,
https://www.usaspending.gov/#/search/93e04a4292ba460900986f18bc0b5594 (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
240 USASPENDING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AMOUNTS OBLIGATED TO NEW YORK FY 2019,
https://files.usaspending.gov/generated_downloads/all_prime_awards_subawards_201912101358448114
05.zip (last visited Dec. 10, 2019) (on file with authors).
241 Award ID Fain No. DTNH2217H00108.
242 Award ID Fain Nos. 18X920405bNY17; 18X920405cNY16; 18X920405fNY15; 18X920405hNY17;
69A37518300004020NY0; 69A3751830000405dNYL. It is worth mention that Award ID Fain Nos.
18X920405cNY16 and 69A3751830000405dNY collectively include $578,763 in sub-awards to the New
York Office of Court Administration “to assist the courts in fulfilling their obligation to efficiently
adjudicate traffic infractions and misdemeanors” and to “address the issues of timeliness, accuracy and
completeness of traffic records.” USASPENDING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AMOUNTS
OBLIGATED TO NEW YORK FY 2019,
https://files.usaspending.gov/generated_downloads/all_prime_awards_subawards_201912101358448114
05.zip (last visited Dec. 10, 2019) (on file with authors).
243 USASPENDING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AMOUNTS OBLIGATED TO NEW YORK FY 2019,
https://files.usaspending.gov/generated_downloads/all_prime_awards_subawards_201912101358448114
05.zip (last visited Dec. 10, 2019) (on file with authors).
244 N.Y. STATE BUDGET,
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/agencies/appropData/MotorVehiclesDepartmento
f.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
245

Under the Byrne JAG program, states and localities may apply for funds to support criminal
justice programs in a variety of categories, including law enforcement, prosecution, crime
prevention, corrections, drug treatment, technology, victim and witness services, and mental
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New York.246 The New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services received
$8,576,883, with the remaining $4,925,392 going to various localities and their respective
agencies.247
As New York State, as well as its subdivisions and municipalities, accept these funds
from the DOT and DOJ, they are required to abide by the agencies’ regulations
regarding nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs. Per the DOT and DOJ
regulations that implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, funding recipients
may not, among other discriminatory actions:
(i) Deny an individual any disposition, service, financial aid, or benefit provided
under the program;
(ii) Provide any disposition, service, financial aid, or benefit to an individual
which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to
others under the program;
(iii) Subject an individual to segregation or separate treatment in any matter
related to his receipt of any disposition, service, financial aid, or benefit under the
program;
(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or
privilege enjoyed by others receiving any disposition, service, financial aid, or
benefit under the program;
(v) Treat an individual differently from others in determining whether he satisfies
any admission, enrollment, quota, eligibility, membership, or other requirement
or condition which individuals must meet in order to be provided any
disposition, service, financial aid, function or benefit provided under the
program; or
(vi) Deny an individual an opportunity to participate in the program through the
provision of services or otherwise or afford him an opportunity to do so which is
different from that afforded others under the program (including the opportunity
to participate in the program as an employee but only to the extent set forth in
paragraph (c) of this section).

health. 34 U.S.C. §§ 10152(a)(1), 10153(a). The funds are disbursed according to a formula based
on the particular jurisdiction's population and violent crime statistics. Id. § 10156. Grantees may
also make subgrants to localities or community organizations, id. § 10152(b), and some state
funds are set aside for subgrants to localities, id. § 10156(c)(2).
States of New York v. Dep't of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
246 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Awards Made for BJA FY 19 Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program - State Solicitation,
https://external.ojp.usdoj.gov/selector/title?solicitationTitle=BJA%20FY%2019%20Edward%20Byrne%
20Memorial%20Justice%20Assistance%20Grant%20(JAG)%20Program%20%20State%20Solicitation&po=All (last visited Dec. 9, 2019); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, Awards Made for Solicitation BJA FY 19 Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
(JAG) Program - Local Solicitation,
https://external.ojp.usdoj.gov/SelectorServer/awards/pdf/solicitation/BJA%20FY%2019%20Edward%2
0Byrne%20Memorial%20Justice%20Assistance%20Grant%20(JAG)%20Program%20%20Local%20Solicitation (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
247 Id.
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(vii) Deny a person the opportunity to participate as a member of a planning or
advisory body which is an integral part of the program.248
Further, funding recipients may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment
of the objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or
national origin.”249
ii.

New York’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme Discriminatorily
Impacts People of Color
To establish that a law violates Title VI regulations, it must be demonstrated that the law
entails a program, policy, or practice that has a “discriminatory impact.”250 “Once such a
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the [proponent of the law] to demonstrate
the existence of ‘a substantial legitimate justification’ for the allegedly discriminatory
practice.”251 If that burden is sustained, the challenger “may still prove his case by
demonstrating that other less discriminatory means would serve the same objective.”252
The data presented at the outset of this paper demonstrate that New Yorkers of color
are discriminatorily impacted by N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a).253 To recap: in New
York City, the driver’s license suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest
concentrations of people of color is two-and-a-half times higher than in the zip codes
with the most concentrated white populations; outside of New York City, the
suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest concentration of people of color is
four times higher than in the ten zip codes with the most concentrated white
populations.254 And, no substantial legitimate justification exists for this discriminatory
impact imposed by the law. The law is ineffective in collecting outstanding Traffic Debt,
and also jeopardizes public safety.255 It is therefore devoid of any legitimate justification,
let alone a substantial one, for the disparate impact it has on people of color. Finally,
there are several less discriminatory means that would serve the objective of N.Y. Veh. &
49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(1). “The enumeration of specific forms of prohibited
discrimination in this paragraph and in paragraph (c) of this section does not limit the generality of the
prohibition in paragraph (a) of this section.” 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(5)
249 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (emphasis added); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (emphasis added). The purpose of the
regulations is to ensure that “no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, [is] excluded from participation in, . . . denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance from the Department of
Justice.” 49 C.F.R. § 21.1; 28 C.F.R. § 42.101. They apply “to any program for which Federal financial
assistance is authorized under a law administered by the Department.” 49 C.F.R. § 21.3; 28 C.F.R. §
42.103.
250 New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Georgia
State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir.1985)); Larry P. By
Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Board of Education of New York v. Harris,
444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979)).
251 New York Urban League, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1036 (citing Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417).
252 Id. (citing Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417; Larry P., 793 F.2d at 982 n. 10).
253 See supra Section II.
254 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
255 See supra Section IV.c–d.
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Traf. Law § 510(4-a): the law could allow for reduced, waived, or deferred payments,
partial payments, payment plans, community service, or other alternatives. 256 These
means would also more effectively serve to collecting outstanding debt.
For these reasons, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) likely violates 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)
and 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). DOT and the DOJ have affirmative duties under 42 U.S.C. §
2000d–1 to investigate discriminatory activities that receive federal funds and take
appropriate enforcement actions to ensure Title VI’s mandate is given effect.257
Therefore, if New York fails to bring N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) into compliance
with these regulations, the State, as well as its subdivisions, municipalities, and law
enforcement agencies stand to lose substantial DOT and DOJ funding and/or face
enforcement action in court.
c. Eighth Amendment Proscription Against Excessive Fines
The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payments, whether
in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense,’” and applies to, among other
things, civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.258 “[B]oth the Eighth Amendment and § 10 of
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which it derives, were intended to prevent the
government from abusing its power to punish.”259 Thus, the determinative question for
purposes of whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies is whether the government
action in question, at least in part, constitutes punishment.260
The U.S. Supreme Court “consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in
part, to punish the owner.”261 Like forfeitures, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) serves
to punish drivers for Traffic Debt. Although the State may aver that the law is a
collection tool rather than a punishment, research demonstrates that it does not operate
as a collection tool,262 and actually punishes people with suspending their driving
privileges (and the consequences that flow from not having a valid license) for
nonpayment.263 Indeed, that driver’s license suspensions were first introduced, in part,
for the purpose of “punishing unsafe drivers” evinces that driver’s licenses are, in fact,
intended to be punitive.264 Even if the law were found to be a collection tool, a court
could find that it simultaneously serves as punishment (as it does), which renders the

See supra Section VI.a.ii.
Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d
1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
258 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1993) (quoting Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
259 Id. at 607 (citing Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc., 492 U.S. at 266–67).
260 Id. at 610. “‘It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial
goals.’” Id. (citation omitted).
261 Id. at 618.
262 In New York, nearly half of the traffic suspensions issued in 2016 remained in effect one year later,
indicating that suspensions do not serve the purpose of collecting outstanding traffic debt. Weiss &
Wilner, supra note 4.
263 See supra Section IV.a–b.
264 AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 104 at 4.
256
257

49

Excessive Fines Clause applicable.265 Further, the law undoubtedly serves a deterrent
penal purpose, which gives rise to the inference that it is punitive, because it effectively
uses driver’s license suspensions as a means to deter people from not paying or
appearing to contest traffic tickets.266 Moreover, a driver’s license is a property right
protected by the U.S. Constitution,267 which is essentially forfeited upon the suspension
of a driver’s license. Thus, at a minimum, driver’s license suspensions are analogous to
civil forfeitures, thereby warranting the same Eighth Amendment protections against
government encroachment.268
In February 2019, the Supreme Court unanimously incorporated the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fine Clause, making it applicable to states and their
subdivisions.269 The Court determined that “[p]rotection against excessive punitive
economic sanctions secured by the Clause is, . . . both ‘fundamental to our scheme of
ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.’”270 In reaching
its determination to incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court traced back the
roots of the Clause to Magna Carta, which required “that economic sanctions ‘be
proportioned to the wrong’ and ‘not be so large as to deprive [an offender] of his
livelihood.’”271 Furthermore, the Court suggested that courts ought to pay particularly
close attention when evaluating whether punishments used to generate revenue for state
and local government are excessive.272 It explained that “[e]xorbitant [fines] undermine
other constitutional liberties,” and are sometimes employed by governments “‘in a
measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a
source of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’”273
As an initial matter, Traffic Debt suspensions too often result in the deprivation of
peoples’ livelihoods. As discussed above, research shows that suspensions lead to job
loss and lost job opportunities.274 Further, New York’s driver’s license suspension
scheme makes it exceedingly difficult for many to regain their livelihoods postsuspension for it makes it practically cost prohibitive, relative to the resources of those
who are issued Traffic Debt suspensions, for many people to get their licenses reinstated.
In addition to the costly underlying fines, fees, and surcharges, there is a $70 per
suspension STF, which must be paid in a lump sum along with the underlying fines to
Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (“[S]anctions frequently serve more than one purpose. We need not exclude the
possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the
Excessive Fines Clause.”).
266 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (noting that deterrence is a penal goal).
267 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
268 See State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 21 (Ind. 2019) (“When a civil forfeiture is even partly punitive, it
implicates the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines.”).
269 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. 682 (citations omitted). However, the Court did not unanimously agree upon the
vehicle through which the Clause should be incorporated.
270 Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
271 Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
272 Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, n. 9 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“it makes sense
to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit”).
273 Id.
274 See supra Section IV.a. See also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (pursuit of an
occupation or profession is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause); Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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have one’s license reinstated.275 The law’s effect of depriving individuals of their
livelihood suggests an Excessive Fines Clause violation.
The Court, in its historical analysis, elucidated that even though thirty-five out of thirtyseven states had ratified excessive fines provisions in their constitutions by 1868, abuses
still continued:
Following the Civil War, Southern States enacted Black Codes to subjugate newly
freed slaves and maintain the prewar racial hierarchy. Among these laws'
provisions were draconian fines for violating broad proscriptions on ‘vagrancy’
and other dubious offenses. When newly freed slaves were unable to pay
imposed fines, States often demanded involuntary labor instead.276
Black Codes used fines to subject people of color to involuntary servitude.277 The use of
fines to coerce involuntary labor was discussed at length during congressional debates
over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment, and other similar
measures.278 The modern-day practice of punishing people for Traffic Debt bears a
disturbing resemblance to the use of Black Codes,279 which have long been held
unconstitutional.280 The data presented281 and consequences of driver’s license
suspensions discussed earlier in this paper282 evince the existence of a coercive Traffic
Debt suspensions infrastructure that unduly subjugates people of color. Given the
importance the architects of our constitutional framework have assigned to the
prohibition of excessive fines throughout the development of our democracy, and their
use against people of color in the post-Reconstruction Era, a scheme that
disproportionately (and excessively) punishes people of color, and does so for their
inability to pay, should not survive constitutional muster, assuming of course that a court
finds that the Excessive Fines Clause applies.

See supra Section I and IV.a.
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688–89, (2019) (internal citations omitted).
277 Justice Thomas explained the “centerpiece” of the Black Codes “was their ‘attempt to stabilize the
black work force and limit its economic options apart from planation labor.’” Id. at 697 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (citation omitted).
278 Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
279 For instance, a Mississippi law imposed $50 in fines and ten days’ imprisonment on “freedmen, free
negroes and mulattoes” “without lawful employment” convicted of vagrancy. If those convicted did not
pay within five days, “they would be arrested and leased to ‘any person who [would], for the shortest
period of service, pay said fine and forfeiture and all costs.” Id. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring in
judgment) (citation omitted.) An Alabama law was criticized for “almost reenacting slavery” by, “among
other harsh inflictions” imposing a $50 fine and [six] months’ imprisonment on any servant or laborer who
loitered away his time or was stubborn or refractory. Id. at 697–98 (citation omitted). A Florida vagrancy
law afforded judges the discretion to punish those convicted with a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment
for up to twelve months, or “by being sold for a term not exceeding twelve months.” Id. at 698 (citation
omitted).
280 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Such practices were also outlawed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.
281 See supra Section II.
282 See supra Section IV.a–b.
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Once the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Excessive Fine Clause was an
incorporated protection applicable to the states, it remanded the case to the Indiana
Supreme Court. The Indiana Supreme Court had to determine, among other things, the
proper standard by which courts should assess whether in rem forfeitures are excessive.
To do so, the court analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior precedent,283 which led it to
conclude that gross proportionality is the proper standard to apply to determine whether
an in rem forfeiture is excessive.284 Though only useful as persuasive authority outside of
Indiana, the court explained:
To conduct a proportionality analysis at all, we need to consider the
punishment's magnitude. And the owner's economic means—relative to the
property's value [or fine]—is an appropriate consideration for determining that
magnitude. To hold the opposite would generate a new fiction: that taking away
the same piece of property [or demanding the same fine] from a billionaire and
from someone who owns nothing else punishes each person equally.285
The court elaborated that the “historical roots of the Excessive Fines Clause” command
a focus on the economic effects a fine has on the punished individual. “Magna Carta—
from which the [Excessive Fines] Clause derives—specifically contemplated an
economic sanction's effect on the wrongdoer, requiring ‘that [fines] be proportioned to
the offense and that they should not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood.’”286 The
court therefore concluded that to determine if a forfeiture is excessive, the effect of the
forfeiture on the owner must be considered.287
The N.Y. Court of Appeals has agreed with the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation.
When considering whether a punitive forfeiture is grossly disproportional so as to violate
the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court considers, among other things, both “the
seriousness of the crime [or violation] . . . [and] the economic circumstances of the
defendant.” 288 Furthermore, the Court has explicitly stated that “the forfeiture of an
automobile for a minor traffic infraction such as driving with a broken taillight or failing
to signal would surely be ‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's
offense.’”289 The Court continued: “By encompassing many minor and technical
violations that could not justify forfeiture, the ordinance, as enacted, risks violation of
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 35 (Ind. 2019).
285 Id. at 36.
286 Id. at 37 (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335). “‘[N]o man shall have a larger amercement imposed
upon him, than his circumstances or personal estate will bear. . . .’” Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 694
(2019) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 372 (1769)). “[N]o man shall be
amerced even to the full extent of his means. . . .” Id. at 688 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
2 Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of
George II 46–47 (2d ed. 1829)).
287 Id.
288 Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 140 (2003) (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334). Additionally,
New York courts consider “the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant
not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to which
defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged.” Id.
289 Id. (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334).
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the Excessive Fines Clause.” 290 Considering that the effect of an automobile forfeiture
and the suspension of a driver’s license is in essence the same—the impacted individual
is deprived of the ability to drive—it follows that a New York court would likely find
that the suspension of a driver’s license for a nonappearance or nonpayment related to
“a minor traffic infraction such as driving with a broken taillight or failing to signal”
violates the Excessive Fines Clause.
New York law currently requires neither a determination regarding whether payment
would deprive an individual of their livelihood, nor a determination of an individual’s
ability to pay in any stage that leads to a Traffic Debt suspension. Therefore, the
proportionality of the punishment relative to the individual is never assessed. If it were,
in many instances, the suspension of a driver’s license would likely be found excessive.
This is obviously problematic, particularly given that throughout New York, the driver’s
license suspension rate in the ten poorest zip codes is nearly nine times higher than the
suspension rate in the ten wealthiest zip codes.291 The gravity of this issue is
compounded particularly for low-income people because the practical effect of their
driver’s license suspension is permanent suspension due to the mass accumulation of
fines, fees, surcharges, and other costs that attach thereto, which they will unlikely be
able to pay. If a court were to find the Excessive Fines Clause applicable, the current law
is also problematic to the extent that it punishes people without consideration of their
economic circumstances, contrary to New York jurisprudence.292 Likewise, it fails to
account for the lack of serious circumstances that underlie Traffic Debt suspensions.
Surely, driving while intoxicated is more serious than not paying a traffic ticket or
appearing in court to contest it, yet they are both punishable with license suspensions.
In brief, it is difficult (if not impossible) to conceive of a world in which indefinite
driver’s license suspension could be found a proportional punishment for Traffic Debt,
which people—through no fault of their own—lack the means to pay. Similarly, it is
difficult (if not impossible) to justify that people of means, relative to their resources,
suffer little to no harm when faced with traffic tickets and related costs, whereas lowincome people face a cascading snowball effect that results in a mountain of debt and
permanent driver’s license suspension. Because New York law does not require
consideration of an individual’s economic circumstances prior to suspension, if a court
were to find the Excessive Fines Clause applicable, it should also find that many driver’s
license suspensions are an excessive punishment.

Id.
Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4.
292 Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d at 140.
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Appendices
Disturbingly, disproportionate traffic stops and traffic-stop outcomes for people of color
have been the reality in too many localities and states throughout the nation for decades.
For instance, a 1999 study conducted in Akron, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo, Ohio
concluded that Black drivers were about twice as likely to get tickets as those who are
not Black.293 Similarly, a study exposing egregious racial disparities conducted in New
Jersey between 1988 and 1991 led a court to conclude that there was unrebutted
statistical evidence of disproportionate traffic stops against Black motorists, which
established a de facto policy of targeting Black motorists for investigation and arrest,
thus proving selective enforcement violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.294 A lawsuit brought in Maryland predicated on very similar and troubling data,
such as the fact Black people made up over seventy percent of all of those stopped and
searched even though Black people made up just seventeen percent of the driving
population on the relevant highway,295 settled in favor of plaintiffs.296 The appendices
that follow detail more recent data from various jurisdictions that highlight racial
disparities in traffic stops and traffic-stop outcomes.
Appendix A
People of color across the country are disproportionately subjected to traffic stops
by law enforcement.
Greensboro, North Carolina
The New York Times analyzed tens of thousands of traffic stops conducted from 2010
to 2015 in Greensboro, North Carolina. Despite making up just thirty-nine percent of
the driving-age population, Black drivers constituted fifty-four percent of the drivers
pulled over. Further, most of that fifty-four percent were stopped for regulatory or
equipment violations, offenses which police officers have discretion to ignore.297
Furthermore, an analysis of data collected from twenty million traffic stops throughout
the entire state of North Carolina confirmed that on a state-wide level, Black drivers are
about ninety-five percent more likely than white drivers to be stopped.298

David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN.
L. REV. 265 (1999).
294 State v. Soto, 324 N.J. Super. 66, 734 A.2d 350 (Law. Div. 1996); David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial
Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 85
(Summer 2003).
295 David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data
Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 77–78 (Summer 2003).
296 See Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md. 1996) (resulting in a consent decree that
required a halt to an alleged practice of racial profiling on I-95 and data collection in all traffic stops).
297 Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While Black, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-drivingblack.html.
298 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, DEREK A. EPP & KELSEY SHOUB, SUSPECT CITIZENS WHAT 20 MILLION
TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND RACE (Cambridge University Press 2018). The authors
found similarly troubling stop patterns in Illinois, Maryland, and Connecticut.
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Los Angeles, California
In Los Angeles, about nine percent of the population is Black; yet, of the 385,000+
drivers and passengers pulled over by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) from
July 2018 through April 2019, twenty-seven percent were Black. In sharp contrast, about
twenty-eight percent of the City is white and only eighteen percent of those subjected to
LAPD traffic stops were white. A telling indicator of pretextual stops being used against
people of color for reasons unrelated to traffic safety, an equipment violation was listed
as the reason for the stop for over twenty percent of the traffic stops involving Black
and Latinx people, but only for eleven percent of the traffic stops involving white
people.299
An earlier report by the Los Angeles Times revealed that from 2015 to 2018, the
LAPD’s Metropolitan Division stopped Black drivers “at a rate more than five times
their share of the city’s population.” In South Los Angeles, in which approximately
thirty-one of the population is Black, sixty-five percent of the Metropolitan Division’s
stops were of Black drivers.300
Further, a California Department of Justice report recently revealed that throughout the
state, Black individuals accounted for about fifteen percent of the stops examined, while
accounting for only six percent of the state population.301
Minneapolis, Minnesota
In 2018, Minneapolis police officers stopped 7,195 cars for equipment violations.
Although the Black population in Minneapolis is 18.8 percent, 54.8 percent (or 3,940) of
those drivers stopped were Black.302 This is one indicator that pretextual stops are used
against people of color not as means to promote public safety, but rather simply on the
basis of race.
Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, LAPD searches blacks and Latinos more. But they’re less likely to have
contraband than whites., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-lapd-searches-20190605-story.html.
300 Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, ‘Stop-and-frisk in a car:’ Elite LAPD unit disproportionately stopped black
drivers, data show, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019 11:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-melapd-traffic-stops-20190124-story.html. To the Mayor of Los Angeles’ credit, in response this reporting
highlighting racial disparities, he ordered the LAPD to scale back traffic stops—the LAPD scaled back by
about eleven percent, and its Metropolitan Division by about forty-five percent. Ben Poston & Cindy
Chang, LAPD searches blacks and Latinos more. But they’re less likely to have contraband than whites.,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lapd-searches20190605-story.html; Cindy Chang & Ben Boston, Garcetti orders LAPD to scale back vehicle stops amid
concerns over black drivers being targeted, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019, 9:30 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-garcetti-lapd-metro-20190206-story.html.
301 Anita Chabria, Black drivers face more police stops in California, state analysis shows, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
2, 2020, 4:48PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-02/black-drivers-face-more-policestops-in-california-new-state-datashow?utm_source=Today%27s+Headlines&utm_campaign=0598e861beEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2016_12_12_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_b04355194f0598e861be-81947937.
302 Mary F. Moriarty, Traffic stops as criminal investigations: Pretext stops should be disallowed in
Minnesota, MINNPOST (June 6, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2019/06/trafficstops-as-criminal-investigations-pretext-stops-should-be-disallowed-in-minnesota.
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Illinois
Illinois law enforcement agencies conducted 2,272,384 traffic stops involving Black,
Latinx, Asian, and white drivers. While Black individuals made up about fourteen
percent of the populations, they accounted for twenty-four percent of these traffic stops.
Conversely, white drivers were not disproportionately stopped relative to their share of
the population: they make up about sixty-four percent of the population, and accounted
for fifty-eight percent of the stops.303 This means that about 30.12 percent of the Black
population in Illinois experienced a traffic stop in 2017, while only about 16.26 percent
of the white population in Illinois was subjected to a traffic stop. Also, interestingly,
traffic stops in Chicago more than tripled from 2015 to 2017 and Black drivers account
for the majority of this substantial increase in traffic stops.304 Between 2016 and 2017,
Black drivers accounted for almost two thirds of Chicago’s traffic stops.305
Nashville, Tennessee
Between 2011 and 2015, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department stopped an
average of 1,122 per 1,000 Black drivers—this amounts to more Black drivers than even
lived within the county during the relevant timeframe. Black drivers made up just 27.6
percent of the total driving-age population but accounted for 39.3 of traffic stops,
whereas white drivers, who accounted for 63.8 percent of the driving-age population,
accounted for only 55.5 of all traffic stops. Thus, Black drivers in Nashville were stopped
at 1.6 times the rate of white drivers. Furthermore, between 2015 and 2016, Black drivers
were 113 percent more likely than white drivers to be stopped two and five times. Even
more troubling, Black drivers were 374 percent more likely than white drivers to be
stopped between six and ten times between 2015 and 2016.306 This evinces the existence
of significantly heavier policing in communities of color.
Appendix B
People of color across the country disproportionately suffer disproportionately
harsh outcomes incident to traffic stops.
Kansas City, Missouri
An analysis of traffic tickets issued in 2017 by the Kansas City Police Department
processed by the Kansas City Municipal Court demonstrated significant racial disparities.
While Black individuals made up just thirty percent of the population, they received sixty
percent of the traffic tickets, while white individuals, who make up fifty-nine percent of
the population, received just thirty-seven percent of the tickets. Moreover, a single
Kansas City zip code—where ninety-one percent of the population is —“is the most
ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, https://illinoistrafficstops.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019). Other races were
excluded from the study “because the counts reported for these races were mostly too small to check for
any sort of significance.” Id.
304 New ACLU Report Shows Continued Racial Disparities in Illinois Traffic Stops, ACLU ILLINOIS (Jan.
14, 2019), https://www.aclu-il.org/en/press-releases/new-aclu-report-shows-continued-racial-disparitiesillinois-traffic-stops.
305 Id.
306 DRIVING WHILE BLACK NASHVILLE, A REPORT ON RACIAL PROFILING IN METRO NASHVILLE POLICE
DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC STOPS 34, 38–39 (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://drivingwhileblacknashville.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/driving-while-black-gideons-army.pdf.
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common home zip code [in the City] for Kansas Citians receiving tickets.” Finally, the
top traffic ticket charges for Black individuals in Kansas City are poverty-related
offenses, such as the not having insurance and having expired tags.307
Connecticut
Connecticut law requires the analysis of all traffic stops for all police departments within
the state.308 An analysis published in 2015 demonstrated that Black and Latinx motorists
are eleven to forty-one percent more likely to be ticketed than white offenders for the
most common moving violations—speeding, traffic-light violations, and stop-sign
violations—even when stopped for the same offense. It also showed that racial
disparities also exist for equipment violations, such as defective lights, license-plate
problems, and tinted windows: While Black motorists were ticketed in fifteen percent of
these stops and Latinx motorists ticketed in eighteen percent of these stops, white
motorists were only ticketed in nine percent of these stops.309
An analysis of 2017 Connecticut police department data found strong, statistically
significant disparities in how people of color were treated following a traffic stop.310
There was strong evidence that motorists of color were treated differently than their
white non-Latinx counterparts across the state, even when stopped for the same
reason.311 This evidence included that police disproportionately pull over Black and
Latinx drivers during daylight hours, when officers can more easily see who is behind the
wheel.
Further, the 2017 data for City of Derby and Town of Fairfield demonstrate that in both
places, people of color are more likely to receive a misdemeanor summons—a much
harsher outcome when compared to the alternatives of an infraction or a warning—as a
percentage of their total stops.312 In Derby, Black and Latinx drivers were more than
twice as likely to be issued a misdemeanor summons following a traffic stop than white
drivers: 23.22 percent of Black drivers stopped and 19.49 percent of Latinx drivers
Aaron Randle & Kelsey Ryan, Black KC drivers get more tickets than whites. Race is only part of the
problem, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (May 20, 2018, 5:30 AM),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article210495169.html.
308 CT Gen Stat § 54-1m. Notably, the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration provided
financial resources to assist in carrying out the racial profiling studies mandated by Connecticut law. This
suggests that funding may very well be available for New York too if it were to undertake measures similar
to those employed by Connecticut. See INSTITUTE FOR MUNICIPAL AND REGIONAL POLICY AT CENTRAL
CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY, STATE OF CONNECTICUT TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS AND
FINDINGS, 2017 (June 2019), http://ctrp3.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/2017-Connecticut-RacialProfiling-Report.pdf.
309 Matthew Kauffman, Blacks, Hispanics More Likely To Be Ticketed After Traffic Stops, COURANT
(May 10, 2015, 8:04 AM), https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-racial-profiling-ticket-noticket-p-20150510-story.html (“All of the racial and ethnic differences for moving and equipment
violations were highly statistically significant, with less than a 1 percent likelihood that any of the
disparities was due to chance.”).
310 INSTITUTE FOR MUN. AND REG’L POLICY AT CENT. CONNECTICUT STATE UNIV., STATE OF
CONNECTICUT TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS, 2017 (June 2019), http://ctrp3.org/wpcontent/uploads/PDF/2017-Connecticut-Racial-Profiling-Report.pdf.
311 Id. at 34–37.
312 Id. at 64, 84.
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stopped received a misdemeanor summons as a result of the stop, whereas only 9.49
percent of white drivers stopped received a misdemeanor summons.313 In Fairfield, 12.20
percent of Black drivers stopped and 11.23 percent of Latinx drivers stopped received a
misdemeanor summons as a result of the stop, whereas only 2.7 percent of white drivers
stopped received a misdemeanor summons.314 And, almost forty-one percent of the
misdemeanor summons issued were for operation of a vehicle with a suspended or
revoked license; ninety-two percent of all misdemeanor summons issued were for
offenses that are often inextricably connected to poverty.315
California
A 2016 study of traffic violations in California’s Bay Area counties concluded that Black
and Latinx drivers were significantly more likely to be jailed for failure to pay an
infraction ticket.316 It found that white divers were, on average, half as likely to be
booked for failure to pay, while black drivers were four to sixteen times more likely to be
jailed for failure to pay traffic fines.317
Between 2013 and 2015, Black individuals accounted for thirty-three percent of those
arrested on FTP/FTA warrants in Los Angeles County, yet made up only 9.2 percent of
the population. During that time period, 20,000 people were arrested and charged by the
L.A. County Sheriff’s Department for FTP/FTA; eighty-five percent of those 20,000
people arrested were Black and Latinx. Also during that time frame in San Francisco,
when 5.8 percent of the population was Black, Black individuals accounted for 48.7
percent of the FTP/FTA arrests; this stands in stark contrast to the fact that whites, who
accounted for 41.2 percent of San Francisco’s population, constituted only 22.7 percent
of the arrests for traffic warrants.318
Cleveland, Ohio
A 2009 study of traffic citations in Cleveland, Ohio demonstrated that while Black
individuals represented 38.4 percent of the driving population, they disproportionately
shouldered fifty-nine percent of the traffic citations issued that year. Black motorists
were 2.55 times as likely, and motorists of other racial groups 1.8 times as likely, to be
ticketed by police as white motorists. Black motorists received seventy-nine percent of
the citations issued for driving with a suspended license, and sixty-one percent of the
citations issued for seatbelt violations. Based on their proportion of the driving
population, this made Black motorists 7.63 times as likely to be ticketed for driving with
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315 Id. at 85. Thirty-one percent of misdemeanor summons were issued for misuse of motor vehicle plates
or vehicle registration, and twenty-one percent of misdemeanors summons were issued for violations of
minimum motor vehicle insurance requirements. Id.
316 Bender, supra note 99 at 11.
317 Id.
318 BACK ON THE ROAD CALIFORNIA, supra note 115; Maura Donlan, A disproportionate share of blacks
and Latinos lose their driver’s licenses because of unpaid tickets, study finds, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016,
12:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-license-suspensions-bias-20160411story.html.
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a suspended license and 2.77 times as likely to be ticketed for a seatbelt violation than
white motorists.319
Nashville, Tennessee
An analysis of 2015 traffic-stop outcomes in Nashville, Tennessee concluded that Black
drivers are overrepresented in all traffic-stop outcomes: though representing only 27.8
percent of the driving-age population, Black drivers accounted for forty to fifty-six
percent of all warnings, traffic tickets, state citations, and arrests following traffic stops.
Further, the risk of receiving a state citation was 8.4 times greater for Latinx drivers and
3.1 greater for Black drivers than white drivers, and the majority of state citations issued
to Latinx drivers were related to driving without a license. 320
Iowa
Studies of traffic stops in Iowa have found that Black individuals are disproportionately
ticketed and arrested, and much less likely than their white counterparts to have a stop
end with a warning. In Linn County, Black drivers are twenty-five percent more likely
than white drivers to receive a citation, rather than a warning, when stopped for a traffic
violation. In Scott County, Black drivers are twice as likely than white drivers to be
arrested after stopped for a traffic violation. In the City of Waterloo, Black drivers are
substantially more likely to be arrested incident to a traffic stop, and substantially less
likely to receive a mere warning, than white drivers.321
Chicago, Illinois
A ProPublica report found that thousands of mostly black drivers are filing for
bankruptcy to cope with Traffic Debt. The report found that the issuance of tickets for
failing to have a required vehicle sticker disproportionately impacted Black communities:
the ten Chicago communities with the highest rates of sticker ticketing between 2011
and 2015 are more than eighty percent Black. It further found that duplicate tickets for
sticker violations were disproportionately issued in Black neighborhoods—“more
citations were issued, per household, in low-income [B]lack neighborhoods than
anywhere else.” Inferentially then, Black individuals represent a disproportionate share of
the roughly $275 million owed for sticker tickets issued between 2012 and 2018.322
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